

the AURANTIACO



A Letter from the Editors

To the reader,


Francis Bacon wrote, “Without true friends the world is but a wilderness.” We cannot help but recall this quote to mind when we reflect on the many accomplishments of this journal over the past three years. As the quote suggests, the exploration of the world around us is intimately connected to friendship and community. Friendship and community are at the heart of *The Aurantiaco*’s purpose at Clemson, and the fruits of our labors are the powerful pieces of writing authored, edited, and published by Clemson students.

For the past three years, we have had the pleasure of watching *The Aurantiaco* support and promote the work of students in the humanities and social sciences. Our editors, authors, and leadership consistently demonstrate a serious commitment to academic excellence in their work. More importantly, however, they demonstrate a sincere commitment to the Clemson humanities community as a whole. The journal’s co-founders conceived of a journal that would bring students together to celebrate their incredible accomplishments, dedication, and talent. Their vision was accomplished and continues to exceed even our own expectations. We are incredibly moved by the encouragement of both students and faculty alike. This year, we received our greatest number of submissions yet and hosted our first ever “Spring Symposium” with over one hundred fifty attendees. We are so grateful for the many individuals who put their time and energy into working with our team, and we cannot wait to see how our journal continues to grow.

We would like to conclude by thanking our co-founders, Ms. Meredith Johnson and Ms. Louise Franke, without whom neither of us would be a part of this organization. Their commitment to this vision of an organization that could simultaneously cultivate creativity, excellence, and community was remarkable. Moreover, their leadership and friendship provided an example to us as freshmen of the wonderful people and opportunities at Clemson. For these things, and many others, we are so grateful. We are honored to present to you this year’s journal. The following work is only a small sample of the incredible talent at Clemson. We do hope you enjoy it.

Sincerely,

Brigid Alvis & Elise Bloom



Cover art by Jeb Brown

Table of Contents

A Letter from the Editors	3
Film & Photomontage: Editing into Abstraction <i>Written by Chloe Owens, Edited by Elizabeth Zarrilli</i>	6
Humanity’s Suicidal Beauty <i>Written by Jeb Brown, Edited by Charlotte Cross</i>	9
Trials of an Islamic Sea: The Failure of Christian Missionaries to Counter Islam in the 19th and 20th Centuries <i>Written by Matthew Ployhart, Edited by Lincoln Harder</i>	14
California and the Civil War: Union, Confederacy, or a Californian Republic? <i>Written by Madeline Leonard, Edited by Michael Stebbins</i>	20
Zora Neale Hurston Wrote, ‘Let There Be Light!’ : Illuminating Diverse Voices in American Literature <i>Written by Olivia Mathis, Edited by Andrew Hiner</i>	25
Rostova, Religiosity, and Raunchiness: Tolstoy’s Reflection of Female Characters in War & Peace <i>Written by Taylor Marks, Edited by Lincoln Harder</i>	28
The End of History, Revisited: Analyzing Fukuyama Through Modern Lenses <i>Written by Owen Eastman, Edited by Helena Harte</i>	32
Japanese Modernization and Cultural Globalization: Western Influence in Nineteenth-Century Japan <i>Written by Andrew Hiner, Edited by Caroline O’Neal</i>	37
Russia, Ukraine, and the Ghosts of a Bloody Century: An Analysis of Field Reporting by Russia Today <i>Written by Lincoln Harder, Edited by Russell Crosthwait</i>	41
Can the Philosopher Be a Christian: Examining the Relationship of Faith to the Philosophic Life <i>Written by Raleigh Adams, Edited by Charlotte Cross</i>	45
References	50
Staff	56

*Dedicated to Dr. Adam Thomas,
for his countless contributions to the
humanities community at Clemson.*

Film & Photomontage: Editing into Abstraction

Chloe Owens



Theories of montage have been in circulation for over a century now and yet to most of the contemporary public, the word ‘montage’ only ever appears in the form of a movie makeover, training, or aging “montage” which is used to move the audience along in the story quickly. Compared to original Soviet montage theories, this is a shallow attempt at it and is better suited to the category of ‘sequence.’ Alternatively, ‘montage’ in visual art refers to photomontage, a practice popularized during the World Wars by the activist-artist group Dada. This technique, ‘photomontage,’ was then co-opted by Russian artists working in the Soviet Union. After discussing Dziga Vertov’s theory of film montage and the theory behind Russian photomontage, this essay will examine Michelangelo Antonioni’s 1966 film *Blow-Up* and how it synthesizes these two practices into an entirely new form of abstraction.

The French word ‘montage’ simply means ‘editing.’ In the context of art, it refers specifically to the practice of rearranging a raw material according to the artist’s vision to convey some thought or emotion, often political. Photomontage gained significant traction in pre-War Germany among the activist-artist group Dada, and subsequently in Russia leading up to and following the Bolshevik Revolution. The practice then became a central force in the Soviet Union’s propaganda. Photomontage is well fit for propaganda due to two elements; it communicates primarily through images, a universal language, and is easy to reproduce for distribution. The efficacy of film and photomontage as embodiments of the idyllic Soviet lifestyle are necessarily tied to the montage techniques behind them.

In Dziga Vertov’s essay “Kinoks: A Revolution,” he declares the camera “more perfect than the human eye,” specifically because of the boundaries of a camera frame.¹ The title of this manifesto refers to the group of avant-garde filmmakers in the USSR that he was a part of

and translates literally to ‘cinema eyes.’ Vertov is passionate about the realism of cinema and this is immortalized in his 1929 film *Man with a Movie Camera*. Using a documentary approach to record the day of the Russian worker allowed Vertov to construct a narrative of the USSR as a well-oiled machine. The film is the purest embodiment of Vertov’s concept of the camera-as-eye, in which the camera is used as a stand-in for the human eye. This approach creates the impression of realism and authentic documentation when it is instead a very carefully crafted piece of propaganda. Camera-as-eye is central to how Vertov considers cinema and its function in society. However, the power comes from the editing, not the filming process itself. Vertov describes the process of ‘the Kinoks’ in his essay as:

Within the chaos of movements, running past, away, running into and colliding—the eye, all by itself, enters life ... A day of visual impressions has passed. How is one to construct the impressions of the day into an effective whole, a visual study? If one films everything the eye has seen, the result, of course, will be a jumble. If one skillfully edits what’s been photographed, the result will be clearer. If one scraps bothersome waste, it will be better still. One obtains an organized memo of the ordinary eye’s impressions.²

Vertov viewed the editing process as a way to produce an ideal reality out of the jumbled impressions of the eye, resulting in his idea of intervals. Intervals are rhythmic sequences of shots that conjure distinct feelings or thoughts when viewed in their entirety. The subject of Vertov’s work is often the idyllic collectivism and technological progress of the Soviet Union. The interval lies in the space between the shots, during which the viewer can conjure mental associations and conclusions, making it a collaborative medium with the audience. Intervals function alongside



the editing process, creating a carefully curated experience. That impression of reality could then be distributed around the nation, furthering the reach of the Soviet Union.

While photomontage was utilized by Russian artists as a means to convey Soviet idealism, it was initially developed by the Dada artists, a group of German creatives that aligned to oppose Nazi rhetoric and propaganda. Using advertisements, newspapers, and photographs, the Dadaists carefully arranged clippings into layered compositions to be printed and distributed among the masses, effectively distributing propaganda contrary to the agenda of the Weimar Republic. Art historian Dawn Adès compares the two movements in her 1976 book *Photomontage*:

The dramatic development of Soviet cinema has close parallels with that of photomontage. The use in film of dynamic, rapid inter-cutting, disrupting unit of time and space and making comparisons and qualifications, the use of alternating close-up and distance shots, overlapping motifs, double exposures and split-screen projection, all have equivalents in photomontage.³

Adès continues her discussion using filmmaker Lev Kuleshov’s understanding of the material (in this case, photographs and celluloid) as reality and the editing process as the means through which the director/artist reconstructs it into their vision. This is the central tie between photomontage and film montage—they allow for the rearrangement, alteration, fabrication, and layering of realities. This is the ultimate power of montage—and this is precisely what director Michelangelo Antonioni experimented with in 1966.

Antonioni’s mod mystery *Blow-Up* centers around a fashion photographer and his developing fixation on a series of photographs he captured in a park.⁴ Thomas (played by David Hemmings) becomes convinced that his camera was witness to a murder that he did not notice and spends the duration of the film trying to figure out which reality is true. By the final scene, Thomas seemingly accepts that the reality recorded in the photographs is inaccessible to him now and will only ever exist in their celluloid frames. This focus creates an important intersection between the fictional photo and the film itself, which must be considered before continuing. Film theorist Siegfried Kracauer outlines four affinities that photography possesses, one of which is for ‘the indeterminate.’ According to

Kracauer, “The photographer endows his pictures with structure and meaning to the extent to which he makes deliberate choices. His pictures record nature and simultaneously reflect his attempt to assimilate and decipher it.”⁵ This can be seen as Thomas pores over the blown-up photographs, obsessively searching for what he failed to capture, the missing context around the frame—searching for the indeterminate.

Building on this already complex foundation, Antonioni recurringly uses compositional layering and blocking in ways reminiscent of assembly. The resulting stills constitute photographs in and of themselves when viewed in isolation. Additionally, there are sequences of incongruous cuts and disconcerting changes in camera perspective that occur throughout the film, harkening back to Vertov’s emphasis on the post-production editing process. Perhaps the most interesting part of this synthesis of filmic and photographic montage techniques is that *Blow-Up* is not trying to make a political statement. This stands in direct opposition to the original purpose of montage techniques. The film instead leans into the abstraction of both story and shot.



Figure 1. Two model hopefuls watch Thomas.

In a conventional film, a shot like figure 1 would have a focal point to anchor the viewer (likely Thomas’s back as he turns away). Antonioni does not give us this. All three figures are faced away from the camera, the bodies of the two girls cropped by the camera frame and Thomas partially obstructed by the wall and the photos he has been relentlessly studying. Looking

at the still, the viewer’s eye aimlessly scours for something to focus on but every aspect of the shot is only a partial. It feels so precisely constructed as though each shape was cut and assembled by Antonioni—and yet the composition does not share information or context, it only withholds. At every point, montage in *Blow-Up* serves only to obscure information from the audience and drive the film towards abstraction—be it through discontinuous editing or obstructed shots.

Antonioni’s innovations in montage completely repurpose the concept for a Modernist setting. Since World War II, art has become increasingly abstract and less representative—this is precisely the time in which *Blow-Up* operates. The film has no blatant call-to-action or thinly-veiled propaganda; it is hardly even a narrative piece. Yet, it utilizes montage from both film and photography to abstract an initially convincing reality into a bewildering liminal space. In the resulting abstraction, Antonioni forces the audience to question the truth of an image and the truth of our experience without a resolution. Antonioni’s innovations in montage resulted in a work that is of its time and yet utterly transcends it, making it one of the most successful works of cinematic abstraction in history.

Humanity’s Suicidal Beauty

Jeb Brown

The contemporary period is defined by two principles. One is that of a utopian existence for the entire human race. The other is that of the free individual, who bears responsibility for his own decisions. These ideals are so prevalent in the politics, art, and education of the contemporary era that it is necessary for any informed individual to have a solid grasp of both ideals and how they relate to each other. This paper will explore the relationship between these two ideals through their influence on the novel “Bartleby” by Herman Melville, as well as the novel *We*, by Yevgeny Zamyatin. The manifestation of the modern ideals of utopian collectivism and free individualism in these novels unravels the fundamental tension between the two ideals and prepares the reader to reconcile the manifestation of them in their own life. Melville’s “Bartleby” demonstrates the way tension between the individual and society manifests in the life of the common man. *We* by Yevgeny Zamyatin expands this tension to the fundamental conflict between the modern ideal of an industrial, utilitarian society and the modern ideal of a free, empowered individual.

“Bartleby” follows the perspective of a New York lawyer and his encounter with the strange scrivener Bartleby. It is through witnessing Bartleby that the lawyer and the reader learn what the conflict between modern society and the modern individual looks like in practice. The lawyer begins Bartleby’s tale by describing his law office. Of utmost importance is the lawyer’s description of “a lofty brick wall, black by age and everlasting shade...pushed up to within ten feet of my windowpanes.”¹ The wall is imbued with two primary qualities. Firstly, it is black and eclipsed with shade, creating a sense of dread and depression. Secondly, it is ancient, evidenced by the fact that age has caused its discoloration and by the use of everlasting to describe the shade which eclipses it. This supposed “agedness” is too great for any actual wall in New York, a relatively

young city, so the wall must be understood as existing both before and beyond the city. The wall serves as a symbol for the eternal march of civilization and industry of which New York is only the current iteration. This symbol of the wall is used throughout “Bartleby” as a stand-in for the modern industrial ideal and as an antagonistic force against Bartleby.



Bartleby himself serves as a distillation of the modern ideal of a free individual. Bartleby demonstrates this freedom in his ability to exercise his preferences. When asked to proofread the copies of the documents he has typed, Bartleby responds by stating that he “would prefer not to.”² This preference, while more polite than an outright refusal of the lawyer’s instructions, is still functionally a refusal to fulfill the duties of a scrivener. This is the first instance in the novel of Bartleby exercising his individual freedom, demonstrating that he is more than a cog in the industrial machine of Wall Street; however,

within the confines of such a system as Wall Street, Bartleby's individual freedom has lost its nobility. Bartleby has no outlet for this freedom outside of his pretentious preferences and his unique and extreme diligence in copying. Bartleby copies law documents all hours of the day and night, "by sunlight and by candlelight... he wrote on silently, palely, mechanically."³ It is unclear whether Bartleby's industriousness demonstrates an acceptance of his role in the industrial ideal or if his unorthodox methods of copying are a further protest. Ultimately, the motivation for Bartleby's actions are irrelevant; what is relevant about Bartleby is that he is acting independently of the expectations imposed on him. It is this departure from the standard actions of his position which makes Bartleby a free individual.

Bartleby's freedom finally collides with the Wall when his diligent copying leaves him temporarily blind and no longer able to work. The lawyer permits this arrangement until he realizes that Bartleby has permanently given up copying, regardless of the state of his eyes. Bartleby has instead taken up staring out his window at the monolithic wall, contemplating the system it represents, but to no avail. Despite his contemplation, Bartleby never comes to understand his own motivations, the system he is a part of, or his acts of protest.

Bartleby's newfound position outside of the system he was a part of not only confounds the lawyer but also immediately creates tension within the law office. After realizing Bartleby will no longer copy, and is thus no longer productive, the lawyer immediately compares him to "a millstone," stating that Bartleby is "not only useless...but afflictive to bear."⁴ Due to the lawyer's inability to understand Bartleby outside of his role within the law office, the lawyer immediately declares Bartleby a burden once he is no longer productive. From that point onward, Bartleby's employer makes it his priority to get rid of Bartleby and restore order and efficiency to the system of his law office. Bartleby is not actively disturbing the system; however, his preference not to participate in the system he is trapped inside of is enough to incur a dramatic response. His mere lack of participation prompts a cascade

of increasingly grand and desperate gestures on behalf of the lawyer to eradicate the anomaly of Bartleby. Ultimately, "Bartleby" further develops the ways in which societal systems dehumanize their participants. Bartleby is valued as a machine only for his capacity to do work. Any greater aspect to his humanity is ignored and suppressed. It is this reaction to Bartleby's radical freedom which reveals the incompatibility between the modern ideal of the free man and the modern ideal of a perfectly ordered and efficient, utopian society.

Radical freedom is at odds with perfect order, and yet both ideals are hallmarks of Bartleby's journey and of contemporary thought. It may, at first, seem that the perfectly ordered efficiency of industry embodied in "Bartleby" by the symbol of the Wall is an antagonistic, potentially even an evil force, due to its incompatibility with freedom; however, the reader should not be so quick to dismiss the industrial ideal simply because it conflicts with the idea of total freedom. The society against which Bartleby clashes is not forcing him to live like a machine. American society, particularly for a man like Bartleby in the time and place of the novel, offers the opportunity for great freedom and success within the confines of its cultural and economic system; however, even such freedom as is found in America is constrained when compared to the freedom enjoyed by Bartleby. Bartleby's freedom is total and stands even above reasonable justification or societal convention.

Bartleby's radical freedom may seem appealing conceptually, but its effects are anything but noble. Bartleby is not a mighty hero warring against a dark dystopia. His rebellion is unconscious and is driven by anomalous compulsions not to participate rather than conscious protest. Additionally, Bartleby's protest is muddled. While all his actions defy convention, many of them make him a more efficient component of the industrial machine, and do not win him the ideal noble freedom of a true individual. "Bartleby" demonstrates not only the conflict between the modern ideals of efficient utopian industry and individual freedom, but also demonstrates that the realization of either

ideal is not entirely possible or even desirable in contemporary society. To further investigate the conceptualization and actualization of these two dueling modern ideals, it is necessary to turn to a work which abstracts these two ideals to a form unmarred by the complications of practical experiment. The novel *We* provides such an abstraction.

We demonstrates the ease with which one can discover the conflict between the ideal of a free individual and the utopian ideal of a perfectly efficient society in a world without all of the distractions and eccentricities present in the contemporary era. *We* follows the story of D-503, the head engineer on the One State's new spaceship, the Integral. The novel *We* is D-503's journal, in which he describes the days leading up to the launch of the Integral. During this time, D meets I-330 and is enamored with her unknowability. It is D's interactions with I which begin to illuminate his individual freedom, culminating in D's diagnosis of a soul. Immediately prior to his diagnosis, D is in turmoil due to his jealousy of I's other potential relationships.⁵ This jealousy and gnawing worry are traumatic enough that they begin to make D aware of a self beyond his role in the one state. D's distress illuminates to him his own self, his soul, but he can so far only see the shadow cast by his soul behind him.⁶ This is demonstrated by D's attempt at a description of what he is feeling. As he says, "I feel that I must glance back, but it's impossible...I run faster and faster, and feel with my back—my shadow runs faster behind me."⁷ D is only just beginning to feel the shadow cast by his soul and is still far from seeing his soul clearly; however, unlike Bartleby who is never quite aware of his plight of individual freedom, D is not left to struggle in this confusion for long.

Due to his obsession with I, D cannot help but run to I's apartment and loiter around it waiting for her.⁸ This minor abnormality caused by his distress is quickly noticed in the highly efficient system of the one state. D is caught by S, a guardian tasked with maintaining order, and he is taken to the medical office where he is promptly informed that his distress is due to the development of a soul.⁹ D's soul, the shadow of

which he was only barely aware of, has suddenly and clearly been identified for him. The doctor goes on to explain the way this soul operates. Like a defective mirror "softened by some fire" D-503 no longer perfectly reflects his experiences, allowing them to pass him by without friction.¹⁰ Instead, D-503 now absorbs his experiences. He is affected by them in a way that plagues both himself and the one state. D's ability to be individually affected by his experiences, his ability to ascribe significance to them beyond their practical significance to the One State, alienates him from utopia. The doctor further compares this soul to a vestigial organ,¹¹ for the soul is no longer necessary now that society has arrived at realization of the collective ideal.¹² D-503's visit to the doctor not only fully illuminates to him the presence of his own soul, but also demonstrates the significance of his soul. D is now aware that his soul burdens the one state, creating useless friction in their now perfect world. D, through the offices of the one state, has been saved the trouble of figuring out his soul and its effects for himself. D has had everything about his soul and its consequences, consequences for his life and for the one state, immediately revealed to him. In the utopian society of the one state, even the journey to discover one's soul is streamlined. D demonstrates the awareness which Bartleby lacked, yet D's awareness of his individual freedom does not make the use of it any easier.


To fully understand D-503's struggle with his individuality, it is necessary to understand the society he stands in defiance of. The One State may seem dystopian, but there is no evil hiding under the surface of this utopian ideal. No one ever goes hungry, any disorder is swiftly and efficiently corrected, and executions are infrequent and humane. Even music and poetry flourish, albeit in a strange form, for the One State mandates that art and music follow the same perfectly ordered rationality of math and science. The one state is somewhat unnerving, as are all pictures of utopia, but it has successfully eradicated problems such as hunger, poverty, bigotry, and class conflict. *We* asks the reader to consider if their individuality is worth the price of these evils. It is this question which D struggles to

answer even after he becomes self-aware.

Despite having his own soul revealed to him without the struggle of finding it for himself, D is still left with a great obstacle that even the One State cannot help him with. That obstacle is the decision D must make either to sacrifice himself to the One State or to sacrifice the One State to himself. D constantly faces this question after his soul begins to emerge and is most clearly demonstrated when he hears the news about the eradication of imagination in the one state gazette.¹³ Upon hearing the news D describes himself as “Saved! At the very last moment.”¹⁴ D knows that the eradication of his imagination will destroy his soul, enabling him to return to perfect efficiency in his function for the one state. While it may seem odd, D respects and appreciates the beauty and efficiency of the one state despite its inability to coexist with individual souls. D, upon first hearing the news of the great operation, would rather lose his soul and be freed from irrational, inefficient action than continue to live in disunity with the one state. D wants to be perfect and machinelike just as the operation promises.¹⁵ D is pained by the friction and struggle his soul creates in his life and is joyous about the prospect of being free from such a struggle. D even compares himself to Atlas, as it is through his role in the One State that he too can ascend to Godhood.¹⁶ He can be a perfect cog in the perfect machine and do his part to hoist up the world on his shoulders.

Ultimately, D’s perfectly rational desire to undergo the operation is thwarted by the irrational desires of his soul. When questioned by the other citizens why he does not get the operation, he says, “I will, later. I must first...”¹⁷ This statement is enough to throw D from his perfect dream of ordered efficiency into muddled chaotic action. D cannot answer why it is that he must see I-330 before undergoing the operation.¹⁸ D is no longer choosing to act according to the perfect reason he idolizes; instead, D has begun listening to his irrational, imperfect soul. D is a rebel against reason, bent, irrationally, towards fulfilling his personal desires even when he has no rational justification for them. D has become a microcosm of the tension

between the individual and the One State, between chaos and order, and though his mind chooses the One State, his actions choose the desires of his soul. D is left to choose between the loss of his individuality to preserve the frictionless beauty of the One State or the destruction of the One State to preserve the beautiful freedom of his soul. The individual in the modern world is caught between



two irreconcilable ideals, one of utopian harmony and one of the unbridled soul. Both of these ideals possess a beauty which D-503 cannot live without; however, to fully embrace one would fully destroy the other.

In the hyper-efficient world of *We*, it is easy to lose sight of the way the conflict between the ideals of utopian community and rugged individualism manifests in modern life. However, one must not dismiss either or both ideals because one takes issue with a single manifestation of

either. Many today are quick to reject utopian dreams and fantasies, and rightly so, but everyone among mankind wishes for companionship in some form. *We* demonstrates that a relationship with organized society requires a control, suppression, or partial loss of self and asserts that a perfect relation to society would require a total loss of self; however, D’s relationship with I also requires a partial loss of autonomy and a submission to I’s will. Ultimately, any sort of relationship to other individuals or to society requires at least partial self-suppression or self-control. Totally unbridled freedom cannot coexist with any relationship to others. Many today also wholeheartedly embrace the allure of total individual freedom, but this embrace of the individual comes with two problems: *We* demonstrates that total individual freedom leads to separation and conflict with others and with society, while “Bartleby” demonstrates that such total freedom does not always bring about the lofty and noble existence that many consider the birthright of a truly free man. There is something desirable within both the ideal of utopian harmony and the ideal of a free, rugged individual; however, total commitment to either makes the good in the opposing ideal unattainable. The proper reconciliation of these two opposing ideals is not presented in the novels discussed, but what is clear is that neither rugged individualism nor a utopian vision is worthy of worship or deserving of abandonment.

Trials of an Islamic Sea: The Failure of Christian Missionaries to Counter Islam in the 19th and 20th Centuries

Matthew M. Ployhart

It is the burden of a historian to find interest in subjects which many others consider boring. Relatedly, if I find myself in a bar or restaurant and manage to strike up conversation with somebody, and if circumstances are right, I almost never fail to touch upon what I consider to be a fairly-relevant topic: the origins of the gin and tonic.

Usually it starts with somebody ordering the cocktail, after which, without taking a breath, I dive haphazardly into the familiar story of how “the popular beverage has its origins in imperialism and once the correlation had been made between quinine and reduced malaria susceptibility sometime in the early 1800s, this opened up places such as India and Central Africa to colonization by the West. Of course, Europeans started combining quinine with fizzy water, later called ‘tonic,’ fairly early on, but pure tonic water can be boring, so the British and others took to the habit of adding gin to the beverage...”

I am fascinated with this little story because its implications are so interesting: this little beverage opened up swathes of the planet to unfortunate Western colonization, and colonized it was. By the early 1900s, Western powers had exacted their influence all over the world. Territories all over Africa and Asia were being raped for diamonds, gold, and rubber; cities such as Bombay (now Mumbai) were being rapidly industrialized; and rail and shipping networks were encasing the whole world further into a swiftly-globalizing society. This expansion of people was followed by the expansion and dissemination of goods, products, and ideas - ideas were spread everywhere. Some of them

would linger in their new destinations for decades, inspiring tremendous events to come. European socialism helped to begin the process of liberating Africa from imperialist oppression in the 1960s, American democratic values liquidated empire in China, and capitalist fervor ran rampant in West India.



Often, these ideas spread simply by chance – and they occasionally stuck. In other cases, however, ideas were spread intentionally, via the work of organized groups with clear goals. These were sometimes successful, yet oftentimes not. Perhaps the greatest example of the latter of these instances was the spread of Christianity in the

East – in particular, the geographical, historical region consistently termed the “Indian Ocean World” (IOW).

Of course, this effort was not new. Ever since the arrival of the first European explorers into the IOW in the late fifteenth century, attempts had been made to convert large numbers of locals to the Christian faith. In the Western IOW, in particular, these efforts continued to grow during the nineteenth century, even as the Western Indian Ocean remained largely Islamic.

The activities of Christian missionary groups in the Western Indian Ocean around the late nineteenth century often pointed towards signs of success, and were generally popular among Westerners. Yet, such efforts were largely unsuccessful. This may come as somewhat of a surprise to many – after all, European involvement, including that of missionaries, in the countries within and around the Indian Ocean was widespread. At the very least, the Western IOW encompassed all European interactions along the entire east coast of Africa to the west coast of India, and missionaries operated extensively in this region. Ironically, however, it would be the activities of missionaries themselves, and their efforts to spread Christianity, that would work against their goals and ensure that they were met with limited success.

As mentioned, the goals of spreading Christianity in this region had long existed. The sailors of Vasco de Gama’s 1497 voyage, for instance, searched for the fabled Eastern Christian ruler known as Prester John, and even came to believe that they had found a large population of Christians near what is today India (they had not – the people they found were Hindus). Religious goals, such as those of converting people of the IOW to Christianity, have thus been fairly consistent throughout history. The Portuguese, for their part, attempted to bring Roman Catholicism to places as far as Ethiopia, although in these efforts they would be met with relatively little success.¹ According to Edward A. Alpers, author of *The Indian Ocean in World History*, successor European countries (such as the British and the Dutch) who engaged in Christianizing efforts did ultimately have trade as their primary concern.² Yet both domestic and foreign circumstances soon set the stage for a

plethora of missionary activity in the IOW in the nineteenth century.

Throughout the West, along with the travel possibilities stemming from technological advancements and growing geographical knowledge, interest and ambition led to the rise of solid organizations devoted to missionary activity. According to Walter Russell Mead, scholar of American foreign policy, for instance, tens of thousands of Americans would soon pour out of the United States to promote their spiritual, moral, and social values, and the liberation of people they deemed as living under exploitative and superstitious structures abroad. It was a widespread movement that, as Mead notes, “knew no boundaries of race, sex, or denomination.”³



In Europe, similar excitement was under way. By the 1850s, the famous expeditions of such individuals as British doctor John Livingstone (a missionary himself) in southern and eastern Africa generated widespread publicity for missionary movements.⁴ Such books as *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa* (1857) proved remarkably successful. Other individuals – such as British-American journalist Henry Morton Stanley, who bounced around the Indian Ocean from Ethiopia, the Middle East, and Zanzibar before finally reaching the Congo from East Africa – and their writings also spurred great interest in exploration and missionary activity.⁵

It is within this context that societies such as the Universities’ Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) were established (in this case, in wake of a powerful

speech by David Livingstone himself in 1857).⁶ The UMCA, as well as other Protestant missions, such as the Church Missionary Society (CMS, now the Church Mission Society), devoted themselves in large part to operating on the East-African coast.⁷ The African Inland Mission (AIM) was another influential English-speaking mission to operate in East Africa. Catholic groups, such as the French “Spiritans,” were active in places such as Zanzibar, and the German Evangelical Mission Society for German East African Affairs began operations in Dar es Salaam in 1887 (although German missions such as these tended to support imperial state interests just as much as they did purely-religious ones).⁸

In many of these cases, missionaries and missionary movements had other goals in mind besides simply spreading Christianity, which often involved objectives deemed morally-correct by Western society. Livingstone, for instance, was appalled by the disastrous effects of the East-African slave trade that he encountered during his travels,⁹ while organizations such as the UMCA made it one of their primary objectives to combat slavery.¹⁰ Furthermore, as Mead points out, when confronted with the reality that many foreign peoples were not remarkably enthusiastic about converting to Christianity, an “obvious” solution emerged, “especially because they were hallowed by Christ’s own instructions: Feed the hungry, educate the children, treat the sick.”¹¹

Of course, it should definitely be noted that missions – which constitute a form of cultural imperialism in their own right – are often interpreted as closely linked “to political and economic imperialism.”¹² Far from all missions, missionaries, or mission practices were positive in their effects (the actions of Sir. Henry Morton Stanley are notably controversial), nor were all “missions” religious in nature, as they included many political, medical, and educational efforts that were completely secular. However, the important fact to emphasize is that Christian missionary groups had a widespread presence within, and influence exerted upon, the IOW.

This missionary movement would have remarkable implications in European and North American countries, as well, as Christian missionaries abroad came to sympathize with local

struggles and support indigenous causes against encroachment from Western imperial aggression. After the 1912 establishment of a republican government in China by Chinese Christian Sun Yat-Sen following a brutal civil war – a government built on the democratic values that many Christian missionaries encouraged – European states attempted to impose the exploitative China Railway Loan upon the country. In response, outraged American missionaries in China wrote furious letters to their friends and family members in the U.S. who then drove perplexed senators in states as remote as Iowa and South Dakota to rail against this exploitative infrastructural bail-out, resulting in the creation of a deal far more favorable to China.¹³

Nevertheless, despite such factors, and even despite the ease of travel allowed by technological advancements such as steam travel,¹⁴ the Christian missionary movement was not nearly as effective or impactful as many had hoped. Although there were tremendous – and, in many cases, irreversible – cultural and political impacts resulting from such activity, both within the IOW and in the West, the actual goals and cultural ideals that missionary movements strove for and encouraged were hindered by a variety of factors.

Most obvious is the fact that, as mentioned, even the most progressive movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often occurred in tandem with the growth of parasitic economic and imperialistic systems that worked in the opposite direction. British attempts to combat slavery in the Indian Ocean in the late Victorian Era, for instance, were largely negated by the booming date and pearl trade between the West and places such as the Arabian Peninsula. (This correlation is covered extensively by Matthew S. Hopper, author of *Slaves of One Master: Globalization and Slavery in Arabia in the Age of Empire*). While it was not the case that these unfortunate developments were always associated with missionary activity, they nonetheless acted against the progressive goals that many missionary movements sought to achieve, implicitly rendering the gaining of converts via charitable practices less effective.

Additionally, as most would expect, not all missionary movements were peaceful or

nonviolent, and locals were often unreceptive to what in many cases amounted to forced cultural exchange. Even when missions did gain converts, the extent to which their impacts on society were achieved could be called into question. Nile Green, author of *Bombay Islam: The Religious Economy of the West Indian Ocean, 1840-1915*, demonstrates that even successful conversions could still have violent consequences. As Green notes, residents of Bombay once expressed their disapproval of the actions of the CMS with violence via the stabbing and wounding of a Muslim convert.¹⁵


However, one of the greatest hindrances to Western Christian missions in the IOW was the preestablished presence of Islam itself, which Vasco de Gama’s sailors encountered as far south as the Swahili Coast in the late fifteenth century.¹⁶ Islam was already well established, in various forms and sects, throughout much of the region. In fact, despite often being practiced in different forms, it had the ability to unify states, which greatly facilitated its spread and influence (this trend even allowed the Ottoman Empire to expand so much that they managed to pressure Ivan the Terrible of Russia to oblige some of their wishes).¹⁷ The Western IOW that the Christian missionaries of the nineteenth century walked into, although host to a wide variety of religions and cultures, was to a large degree an Islamic one.

Yet, the West seemed to be relatively unaware of this, particularly regarding regions such as East Africa. When Christian missionary societies, such as those discussed earlier, took greater initiatives along the African coast in the mid nineteenth century, they did not expect to encounter a significant Muslim presence in the interior, and even expressed confidence “of [Islam’s] collapse in the face of modernity.”¹⁸

This belief often led missionaries to begin work in the wrong places: “the primary aim of all Christian missions that began work in East Africa during the second half of the nineteenth century was to reach the ‘pagan’ peoples of the interior,” rather than focusing on the (largely Muslim-controlled) coastal transportation hubs.¹⁹ Islam was simply viewed as declining in East Africa, or even absent from the interior entirely. This was so widely believed that little concern was given to converting Muslims – a practice often discouraged by Christian

mission leaders.²⁰

Perspectives would change, of course, as Christian missionaries realized just how widespread Islamic religion and practices were, even in the East-African interior. By the First World War, missionary groups were sounding a host of alarms. “For a group such as the UMCA,” Sanders notes, “‘the Mohammedan Problem’ was [now] seen as the most important problem facing the Church in East Africa.”²¹ Efforts to re-route mission activity to the East-African coast, where it was perceived that Muslim influence upon Africa’s interior originated, were undertaken following the acknowledgement of this reality.



Whereas Christian missionaries had once possessed little, if any, concern about Islam in places such as East Africa, it was now perceived as so threatening to their efforts that, in one particular instance, a Catholic meeting in 1912 encouraged cooperation with Protestant missions to combat the “opposition from Islam.”²² Nevertheless, by the

turn of the century, it was clear that the goals of Christian missionaries in spreading their religion had fallen considerably short, particularly in the face of widespread and widely-practiced Islamic belief. Alpers states that, “coastal [Sufi] shrines dotted the Indian Ocean, while seafarers regularly called upon specific Sufi saints to protect them from the many hazards of sea travel,” even in a world by then full of steamships.²³ Ironically, it was due largely to the introduction of novel technologies into the region by Westerners (and missionary movements) that the continued spread of Islam was ensured: even sometimes via the use of missionary-like Islamic activity.

Due to growing industry and commerce in colonial Bombay, for example, Muslim travel between the coast as well as the hinterland of India flourished. Such movements included Muslim “missionary activities to Iran and South Africa.”²⁴ Green even notes that, in an attempt to liberalize the regional “religious economy,” Christian missionary societies introduced forms of technology that ultimately enhanced the ability of their competitors to spread religious doctrine.

The introduction of new technology resulted in growing religious diversity, rather than its standardization, as Christian missionaries had hoped for. It was also not due only to missionaries, but was a natural consequence of the “increasing social complexity of a cosmopolitan and class-differentiated capitalist city.” Industrialization also led to increased printing, which “led to the production of an unprecedented array of printed materials in almost every vernacular language of the subcontinent.” This similarly allowed enhanced

religious diversity and the spread of Islamic beliefs.²⁵ Missionaries, in particular, introduced things such as printing presses.

The arrival of these missionaries into places like Bombay provoked the growth of Islam, rather than its decline. The technological development of the IOW, which was in part facilitated by missionary activity, ultimately allowed various forms of Islam to become widespread. Thanks to these developments, Muslim texts could be printed and spread far and wide. Yet, the greatest novelty they introduced, Green maintains, were the ideological beliefs and methods of preaching associated with missionary activity that Muslims and others soon came to use to their own advantage. In fact, both Christian missionary and Muslim reformist groups, provoked by the new competition, stimulated “new methods of religious production and distribution.”²⁶

The attempt of British and East-India Company officials to create a sort of ideological “free market” in various places within the Indian Ocean by removing any legal restrictions on the activity of missions (in Bombay, in 1813) was followed by the arrival of Christian mission groups who often introduced what were viewed as novel ideas. Preaching in places such as factories and warehouses was a relatively novel tactic. “Christian missionaries pioneered a number of innovations in the technology of religious production and distribution,” Green states, “placing preachers into new social spaces and among new social groups in a way that was largely without precedent.”²⁷ Local religious groups, such as Muslims, were quick to follow suit, establishing their own missions and schools and ultimately reaching new social audiences. Green even records the conversions of high-profile Christians to Islam within Bombay, such as American Consul Alexander Russell Webb and Englishman William Henry Quilliam, which were met with considerable local celebration.²⁸

Ultimately, although Christian missions – both Protestant and Catholic – were widespread throughout the Western IOW by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these operations did not achieve the results that many had expected, or at least not in ways that they had hoped for. It is true, as Mead explores, that Christian missionaries from places like the U.S. achieved many lasting


accomplishments, such as implementing Western social, economic, and political structures. The relative inability of Christians to make significant progress in gaining converts should not negate the many, often successful efforts to establish schools, hospitals, and even entire political entities that, for better or worse, demonstrably made their mark on the IOW.

Although the reality of other, broader factors working against Christian missionaries are important to acknowledge, their interactions with Islam specifically operated in opposition to their efforts, accentuated by their underestimation of how widespread Islam was in the region. The arrival of gin and tonic-drinking Europeans into East Africa, into India, into the Arabian Sea and the Middle East, undoubtedly shaped history dramatically. And, it should be noted that, today, here and there within the IOW are countries (particularly in South-East Africa) where Christianity is widely practiced, or even the dominant religion. Yet, this was not the case for much of the rest of the region, nor were the dreams of converting virtually all of the IOW, and seeing it united under one religion, ever achieved. Turning the page into the twentieth century, the Western Indian Ocean World emerged as one that was still largely Islamic.



California and the Civil War: Union, Confederacy, or a Californian Republic?

Madeline Leonard

 The Civil War is often described as a fight between the Northern and Southern states over the issue of slavery or as a war between the North and the South over the future of the West. However, these descriptions of the Civil War fail to acknowledge the West as an already established, key participant in this monumental period of American history. Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and even states as far west as California significantly contributed to the outcome of the Civil War despite being situated hundreds of miles away from the East Coast. Consequently, since California, a state rich in natural resources and wealth, had yet to forge a clear political identity by the eve of the Civil War, the vital question was raised of who it would side with, if it would support either side at all. Ultimately, the diverse makeup of California led to three major competing political movements throughout the 1850s and 1860s: support for the Union, support for the Confederacy, and support for a push for independence.

Throughout the first half of the 19th century, as the United States continually expanded westward, Americans seeking a new life for themselves pioneered into the frontier. As a part of this westward push, California was acquired in 1848 from Mexico following the conclusion of the Mexican-American War. However, despite its far removal from the East Coast and the grueling, months-long journey there, forcing pioneers to cross the treacherous geographical divides of the Rocky Mountains and desert areas, California quickly drew in a rather large number of people during the subsequent California Gold Rush of

1848-1855. In his memoir, *Hunting for Gold*, William Downie, a former sailor and explorer from Glasgow, Scotland, notes that around the same time that the Californian territory was ceded to America, a man by the name of James W. Marshall discovered gold at Sutter's Mill.¹ News of the discovery spread astonishingly quickly, soon producing a gold fever amongst "men of all ages and in all conditions of life" throughout the country, prompting those with a "lust for gain" and those driven by the hope of "escaping the yoke of poverty" to traverse across the continent and settle down in California.² A portion of these settlers drawn in by the promises of gold were from the North, while others were from the South and still others hailed from overseas. For instance, Downie's memoir vividly describes his journey to California and experiences mining gold there after learning about the gold rush while visiting Buffalo, New York.³ Here, Downie's experiences demonstrate that this gold fever was not limited to American-born citizens, but in fact affected people from across the globe.

Drawing in Americans from across the country and even the world with its promises of gold and riches, California soon became a melting pot of backgrounds and political ideas. In fact, this sudden influx of people into the California territory allowed it to apply for and gain statehood after a mere two years in 1850. However, though accepted into the Union as a free state in order to maintain the balance between free and slave states as a part of the Compromise of 1850, this newly founded state, bubbling with various conflicting political ideas, had yet to establish its identity.⁴ Without proper time to forge its own identity and consisting of a diverse population of infamous

abolitionists, recent immigrants, and former Southerners who had grown up surrounded by pro-slavery and anti-Northern rhetoric, it was not clear what course of action California would take as the nation approached the dawn of the Civil War.⁵ Consequently, though California was not the primary battlefield of the Civil War, the mixings of those peoples and ideas created a "war [of] rhetoric and politics" as East Coast politics continually shaped the emerging West.⁶

The most dominant political movement to emerge was unionism, or the idea that California ought to remain within the Union of the United States of America. Because the North had a significantly larger population than the South by the 1850s and Northerners were often less tied to their areas of origin than their Southern counterparts as a consequence of lower land and home owning rates in the North, people from those states constituted the majority of Californian settlers. As a result, since "those who were from the northern States were unqualifiedly Union men in California," unionism ultimately




emerged victorious despite the large physical distance from the East Coast to the West Coast.⁷

Nevertheless, Californian unionism distinguished itself as unique from Northern unionism. Unlike Northerners who opposed the South due to abolitionist sentiments, the majority Californians who supported remaining within the United States were not in favor of abolition. In fact, prior to gaining statehood, at the beginning of the gold rush many slave owners brought their slaves with them to California to work in the

mines and aid them in their search for gold.⁸ Even after California gained statehood and slavery was outlawed, the roughly 2,200 African Americans residing within California continued on in "virtual slavery" as racial divisions began to solidify within the new state.⁹ Though Northerners with pro-Union sentiments were in the majority, the "active and able pro-slavery minority in California... dominated the politics of the state for the first decade of its existence," leading states in the East to question its loyalty to the Union.¹⁰ Even as Republicans gained control of the legislature and eventually the governorship in the 1860s, "California's Republicans would have saved the Union and slavery," despite generally being against the expansion of slavery.¹¹

In direct opposition to Californian unionists were those who wished to secede and join the Confederate States of America. Those who supported this view were typically former slave owners, were raised in slave States, or had "families, relatives, or friends... living in the South where—after the war began—homes were being ruined and devastated by war," leaving them with bitter sentiments towards the Union.¹² Contributing to this rejection of the Union was the prevalence of a largely adventurous and lawless spirit which had developed in California during the gold rush as well as the presence of many immigrants who lacked specific ties to the Union.¹³ It is unknown exactly how many Californians migrated from those states which seceded and how many others supported the confederacy, with estimates ranging anywhere from as low as seven percent to upwards of forty percent, but it is clear that this minority was particularly active during the build up to and first years of the Civil War.¹⁴ Nevertheless, it is important to note that even some of those "born and reared in the slave section of the United States" felt as though they "could not fight against the grand old flag" on the basis of principle, as noted by the first Governor of California, Peter H. Burnett.¹⁵

In order to promote Confederate interests in California, secret societies such as the "Knights of the Golden Circle," which had a "membership of 18,000 in California in 1860" within the San



Francisco area, and “the Knights of the Columbian Star” were formed.¹⁶ Across the Southwest and stretching north as far as more populated and significant areas such as Los Angeles, pockets of pro-slavery sympathizers strongly expressed their views during the 1850s and the beginnings of the Civil War.¹⁷ The existence of these societies and pro-slavery sentiments throughout California led the Confederate government to entertain the idea of “securing New Mexico and Arizona, and if possible gaining a foothold in California in order to obtain supplies of men, horses, money, etc.”¹⁸ A large group of Texan soldiers under Confederate Lieutenant-Colonel John R. Baylor captured New Mexico and advanced on California in 1861, exciting Californian Confederate sympathizers and leading Lieutenant-Colonel Baylor to report to his superiors that “California [was] on the eve of a revolution” and “would cheerfully join [the Confederacy].”¹⁹

Unfortunately for the Confederates, the Republican candidate for governor, Leland Stanford, won the election that very year by announcing his “desire to preserve the Union without harming southern slavery.”²⁰ Though he only won with 47 percent of the total vote, his election in combination with a strong Republican presence in the state legislature opened greater communication and cooperation between California and the federal government.

This shift in turn closed California off from Confederate influences, as evidenced by letters written between the Secretary of War and various Californian officials.²¹ Through this newly strengthened relationship, officials and agents such as Thomas Sprague were able to uncover and report Confederate plots. For example, Sprague discovered “the intention of the Secessionists to take possession of the Peninsula of Lower California... as one of the preparatory steps to the acquiring of” the rest of California and parts of Mexico, which he then relayed to William H. Seward, the United States Secretary of State at the time.²² However, as the war progressed and the United States quickly shut down secessionist attempts for control in California, secessionist fervor began to waver, either dying out or morphing into support for an independent and separate California. Ultimately, the pro-Confederacy cause lost to unionism since, as a new state, California “had no cause for grievance against the national government” and “the States Rights question had never been a disturbing element in her politics as it was in the East” due to California’s lack of a longstanding identity or prolonged slave holding tradition prior to its outlaw of slavery.²³

Many of the reasons that led Californians to support joining the Confederacy instead drove others to reject the Union and propose the

creation of an independent Californian Republic or a Pacific Republic.²⁴ Separated from the East Coast by the natural physical barriers of the “Rocky Mountains and Great American Desert and lacking telegraphic communication with the States about to go to war” with one another, California developed a sense of distinctiveness as a state in spite of the fact that it had yet to forge a decisive political stance.²⁵ An unknown soldier from California’s 4th Volunteer regiment puts the significance of this great physical distance into the perspective of the day, cataloging in his journal the multiple months long journey from California to the East Coast. Leaving on August 27, 1862 to join the fight on the East Coast, his regiment had only made it to Colorado by September 14, 1862 despite walking up to 18 miles per day.²⁶ However, in addition to the grueling length of the trip, these soldiers encountered dangerous wildlife, such as bears, and the challenge of surviving without a supply chain or any nearby towns to stop in and resupply from.²⁷

Due to this separated nature, California was rather inward-focused, instead working on establishing itself as a state by creating infrastructure for the large number of migrants who poured into California within such a brief period of time. Thus, many within California supported the Pacific Republic movement, believing that the unique spirit of California, born from its pioneer and gold rush roots, would prosper most in an independent California.²⁸ Meanwhile, others suggested that if the Civil War took a turn for the worse, it might be in California’s best interests to “cut loose from both sections and not involve herself in the general ruin.”²⁹ Proponents of this idea suggested that due to its geographical location, situated thousands of miles from the East Coast and the majority of the Civil War conflict, California would become “an asylum of peace and safety, and many thousands would flock to her shores,” ultimately leading to the creation of a new, “mighty, prosperous and independent nation.”³⁰

Originally, California’s removed position from the conflict in combination with the fact that it “was not called upon to furnish troops for immediate service against Confederate soldiers”

seemed to indicate at the beginning of the Civil War that California might truly be able to choose the path of neutrality as it forged its own identity.³¹ However, Confederate plots for control of California soon demonstrated that its new identity as a state necessitated that California take a side in the inevitable conflict. In the end, despite the “diversified political beliefs of [Californians], Unionist sentiment was overwhelming when actual warfare forced a decision,” leading a lasting pro-Union legacy to emerge.³²

This pro-Union legacy manifested itself in many ways, though it was largely brought about with the help of California’s governors. Throughout the Civil War, California had three governors: John Downey, Leland Stanford, and Frederick Low. During the first stages of the war, from 1860 to 1862, LeCompton Democrat John Downey was governor.³³ Though he was ultimately commended for his loyalty to the Union as governor, his affiliation with the LeCompton Democrats, a sect of the Democratic party in favor of a highly pro-slavery constitution for the state of Kansas, and his “sympathy and cooperation with those plotting to sever California from her allegiance to the Union” cast suspicions on his loyalty to the Union cause.³⁴ However, the subsequent elections of Leland Stanford from the Republican Party (1862-1863) and Frederick Low of the Union Party (1863-1867), both of whom exhibited “extreme Union patriotism,” California’s role as a supporter of the Union was established.³⁵

As Stanford’s governorship progressed, the question of Californian loyalty was answered. Tensions settled and “the people breathed more freely, for now their Executive was unequivocally, and without any reservations, for the Union.”³⁶ Contributing heavily in both manpower from volunteer regiments and money obtained from gold and other natural resources, California played a key role in bankrolling the North throughout the Civil War.³⁷ The repeated pledges to support the Union from governors and state legislators alike led to increasing cooperation between the federal government in Washington D.C. and the state of California, allowing the fledgling state to stamp out secessionist plots. Furthermore, even attitudes regarding the institution of slavery began to shift.



either “establishing a direct route to California or... gaining a foothold on the Pacific Coast” while ensuring a united nation across the American continent for decades to come.⁴⁰

Though the majority of Californians mirrored the stances of Stanford, who emphasized that he rejected the abolition of slavery, and Low, whose Union Party platform he stood for combined Democrat unionism with Republicanism, ardent pro-slavery fervor died out. In fact, many of those who promoted slavery during the period leading up to the Civil War supported the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, if only because they hoped it would bring about the end of the war more swiftly. Nevertheless, a small minority of abolitionists did exist, as demonstrated by the diary of Elizabeth Gunn which mentions the existence of an organization in San Francisco known as the Antislavery Society.³⁸

Californian contributions to the Civil War are often overlooked. Though California committed to supporting the Union despite the numerous possible courses of action available to it on the eve of the Civil War, because California did not have a large physical presence on the battlefield, its involvement and the significance of its choice to support the Union is often forgotten.³⁹ Ultimately, the victory of Californian unionism over pro-Confederacy and pro-Pacific Republic sentiments prevented the Confederacy from



Zora Neale Hurston Wrote, ‘Let There Be Light’ : Illuminating Diverse Voices in American Literature

Olivia Mathis

Zora Neale Hurston’s 1950 essay “What White Publishers Won’t Print” argues that publishers are unwilling to publish work that displays an accurate cultural and socioeconomic range of minority groups, particularly African Americans, in literature unless it appeals to the stereotypes that white audiences are willing to read and accept. At the time of the essay’s publication, a vast body of literature about the diverse experiences of African Americans and other minority groups in America already existed, such as Hurston’s 1933 short story “The Gilded Six-Bits.” Hurston’s work illustrates that a lack of *interest* by the majority of white readers, not a lack of content, has inhibited American citizens’ willingness to develop a complex and fully human understanding of all of its people beyond racial stereotypes.

In the first sentences, Hurston immediately places responsibility on white audiences for a “lack

of curiosity about the internal lives and emotions” of African Americans.¹ She then refines her argument beyond general disinterest, but rather, a disinterest in “any non-Anglo-Saxon peoples within our borders, above the class of “unskilled labor.”² Hurston wastes no time in identifying that white people have no interest in hearing about the lives of people of color, especially not if they are doing well for themselves. Hurston explains that the nation must come to understand why it is essential to bridge “this gap in national literature,” as “solidarity is implicit in a thorough understanding of the various groups within a nation.”³ Hurston appeals to readers by defining basic human understanding as a beneficial transaction necessary for the country’s safety. She is not pleading for minorities to be heard solely for her desire— but because the nation cannot afford the “international stress and strain” of a “lack of knowledge”

exhibited by Americans' lack of interest in their people.⁴ Hurston's language effectively compels individuals to consider a diverse range of works in underrepresented communities.

Hurston uses inclusive language at specific points in her essay that boils the entire population down to "man, like all other animals," to explain from an anthropological perspective that people are "repelled by that which [they do] not understand."⁵ She is careful not to place malicious blame on white American audiences. Instead, she informs her readers that it is their responsibility to indicate interest in understanding and empathy. Hurston's critique reveals the "malign" risk white disinterest in diverse work poses to the nation.⁶ She states there is "no demand" for "incisive and full-dress" stories about Black people "above the servant class," further emphasizing Hurston's point that the issue is not racist white publishers but a more complex disinterest in racial, emotional, and socio-economic diversity from both publishers and consumers.⁷ Once this is made clear, Hurston defines appropriate interest. She clarifies that "a college-bred" African-American "is not a person like other folks, but an interesting problem."⁸ In this depiction, interest lies in a scientific inquiry of knowledge and capability, not a human interest, because they are still "not a person."⁹ Hurston emphasizes why it is essential that the literature white audiences consume and white publishers decide to print is humanizing by referring to a story of slavery. In the story, enslavers tell an educated enslaved person they have no internal understanding of their knowledge and that it is "all on the outside" that he has been turned "from a useful savage into a dangerous beast."¹⁰ Hurston emphasizes the enslavers' lack of knowledge compared to him, as they failed at "trying to trap the literate slave," and their eagerness to dispose of his knowledge as entirely exterior while simultaneously dangerous.¹¹

Though Hurston titled her work "What White Publishers Won't Print," it becomes clear that the responsibility is not on publishers because they are "in business to make money."¹² Instead, consumers "shy away from romantic stories" about African Americans and only care to read when the center of the story is about "racial

indifference."¹³ Publishing companies "cannot afford to be crusaders," so the responsibility falls onto the consumer.¹⁴ To further support her claim, Hurston explains that "various publishers and producers are edging forward a little," but the "lack of public interest is the nut of the matter."¹⁵ Hurston explains that the lives of African Americans "is a group of two" and that white audiences choose to ignore the humanity of African Americans in exchange for the stereotypes presented: a Black man "picking away on his banjo and singing and laughing" or "mumbling about injustice."¹⁶ There is no such thing as "romance uncomplicated by the race struggle" or a story of "upper-class" African Americans without "defeat" because there is no interest from the majority in these stories. White publishers will not print anything that defies these "uncomplicated stereotypes" because they fear disrupting standard perceptions of minorities grouped into the "non-existent."¹⁷

However, a diverse array of black literature outside the scope of Hurston's descriptions already existed before "What White Publishers Won't Print," and many contributions were from Hurston herself. For example, Hurston writes about deep, complex love in her 1933 short story, "The Gilded Six-Bits." Hurston undeniably considers race to be a factor in the story, but the relationship between Missie May and Joe is not one grounded in racial struggle. Missie May and Joe portray a complicated, lovingly unfaithful relationship. They are both working-class people in a predominantly African-American town, but there is "something happy" about their house, its "mess of homey flowers" and "whitewashed" fence.¹⁸ Although Missie May and Joe are closer to unskilled laborers than they are to the upper class, their home is aesthetically pleasing and well-kept, in contrast to the public's perception of African-American lower-class homes. Since Hurston believes that white audiences are only concerned with reading about minorities "above the class of unskilled labor," she details a different perspective of this population than what readers may be used to.¹⁹ The readers are immersed in the loving banter between Joe and Missie May that "pretended to deny affection but in reality

flaunted it."²⁰ Hurston sparsely mentions race throughout the story, and the central plot revolves around human struggles rather than strictly racial ones. For example, Joe wants to take Missie May to the new ice cream parlor opened by a man with a "mouth full of gold teethes," Slemmons. Joe tells Missie May that Slemmons has the "finest clothes" he has "ever seen on a colored man's back."²¹ She replies, "he don't look no better in his clothes than you do in yourn," and then she jokes that Slemmons has "a puzzlegut."²² Joe doubles down in his insecurity, though, telling her that Slemmon's weight makes him "look" like "a rich white man."²³ Hurston mentions race in these lines, which plays an undeniable role in Joe's response to Slemmons, but the heart of the story is in Joe's insecurity and Missie May's reassurance. The conflict is Joe's feelings of insecurity within himself, which is because of Slemmon's money and dress, not directly because of race. Hurston provides the reader with a human experience, not a racial experience.

A central point of conflict in "The Gilded Six-Bits" is Missie May's infidelity. Joe comes home and sees "a quick, large movement in the bedroom," where he sees Slemmons with his wife.²⁴ Hurston focuses on the delicacy of Joe's reaction. For Joe, "the great belt on the wheel of Time slipped and eternity stood still" as he walked into the room.²⁵ At this moment, Joe had "both chance and time to kill the intruder in his helpless condition," but "he was too weak to take action."²⁶ Joe hits Slemmons, and Missie May is sobbing after he leaves. She "kept on crying, and Joe kept on feeling so much and not knowing what to do with all his feelings," so he "laughed and went to bed."²⁷ Hurston explores the complexity of emotions in conversation with each other in this scene. Joe's reaction parallels Hurston's argument about the preconceived notions of minority groups' feelings in "What White Publishers Won't Print." Hurston mocks the public perception that Black people have no "characterization that is genuine without this monotony" that is the "shuffling of feet," "laughing," and "rolling eyes."²⁸ In this scene, Joe and Missie May display a great deal of genuine emotion that is far from monotony. Joe goes

through a human sequence of emotions: anger, betrayal, sadness, and a wave of unidentified emotions that result in laughter. Joe's reaction also defies a stereotype against Black people that Hurston defines as "reversion to type," the "ridiculous notion" that "under a superficial layer of western culture, the jungle throbs in our veins."²⁹ Hurston recognizes that this notion of educated Black people being seen as "a savage" or a "dangerous beast" destroys "a true picture" of African-American life.³⁰ In "The Gilded Six-Bits," Hurston shows that Joe does have the ability to kill Slemmons but reveals that he cannot because of his emotional distress at the moment. His actions directly contrast the view Hurston criticizes of "reversion to type."³¹ The image of Joe feeling so much he can only laugh seems to be a callback to the stereotype Hurston points out of "laughing" and "rolling eyes."³² This is also a critique—the stereotype of Black people only being capable of laughing is dismissed by Joe; he laughs as a result of feeling too many emotions.

In "What White Publishers Won't Print," Zora Neale Hurston wonderfully demonstrates that American consumers must take an interest in the lives and humanity of minority groups, specifically African Americans, for the country's betterment. Her short story "The Gilded Six-Bits," written years prior, proves that literature humanizing black individuals did exist and that white audiences showed little interest in consuming it. Hurston's characterization of Joe and Missie May in "The Gilded Six-Bits" demonstrates complex human interactions and emotional turmoil outside of racial struggle. Hurston's work exemplifies African-American literature as a vast body of diverse writing, portraying deeply human experiences that cannot be reduced to a single movement.


Rostova, Religiosity, and Raunchiness: Tolstoy's Reflection of Female Characters in War & Peace

Taylor Marks

Throughout his most celebrated work, *War and Peace*, Leo Tolstoy illustrates the “virtuous woman” according to 19th century standards. Tolstoy gives careful and purposeful attention to character traits such as religiosity and piety as well as homemaking and childrearing in his “ideal woman.” His concise disdain for those who pose as neither virtuous women aforementioned is reflected thoroughly within his female characters. This essay analyzes Tolstoy's and 19th century Russia's own expectations for women through the three most notable representations of each character trait: Márya and her religiosity, Natásha and her development into a mother and wife, and Hélène as an adulterer and morally corrupt femme-fatale. Each character's carefully crafted personality and value system translates a message to the reader concerning the perspective of Tolstoy, and by extension 19th-century Russian culture, on what makes a virtuous woman.

Throughout *War & Peace*, the concept of female sacrifice is one which Tolstoy describes as a noble and righteous form of femininity and applies to beloved characters such as Márya Bolkonskaya. The novel is descriptive of the jarring and, at points, dreadful relationship between Princess Márya and her father, Prince Nikolai (or Old Prince) Bolkónsky. Old Prince Bolkónsky, in his final and spiteful years, consistently berates Márya and inflicts absolute cruelty upon her with the knowledge that she will always remain loyal to him. Until the Prince's eventual death, Márya does, in fact, remain loyal to the Prince despite his purposeful mistreatment towards her, even regarding those moments as “the pride of sacrifice gathered in Princess Márya's soul” in which she would immediately

halt herself from judgment towards her father's character, even experiencing “self-loathing” for said judgments.¹ This concept of self-sacrifice that permeates Princess Márya's character is indicative of Tolstoy's personal beliefs concerning the value of religiosity and quiet dignity shown through familial aspects. As stated in *A Woman's Place . . . : The Young Tolstoy and the “Woman Question*, Princess Márya Bolkonskaya is regarded as the second “good” heroine aside from Natásha; the text highlights a “string of thoughtful religiosity and high ethical standards” that characterize her religiosity and its virtuous nature, which is consistent with Tolstoy's personal beliefs.²



Tolstoy's own opinions concerning religiosity and its role in shaping the quintessential Russian woman were reflected throughout the 19th century. This concept was referred to as the “sublime sufferers” in *Women in Russian Charity, 1762-1914*. Russian Orthodoxy played a significant role in what became a large part of the aristocratic Russian woman's life in the 19th century. According to the article, throughout

the 19th and 20th century aristocrats had learned that “routine almsgiving was not enough. To devout women Russian Orthodoxy offered a special model of female piety: the woman who devoted her life and fortune to helping others.”³ Thus, devoting both wealth and physical strain to those less fortunate became a far more exemplary form of the aristocratic Russian woman paradigm. This character trait is further applied to Princess Márya, as she is known to house and care for impoverished “pilgrims” and therefore physically and emotionally care for them even against her father and brother's wishes. Beyond this, her dream to go on a pilgrimage and leave her earthly possessions behind, with the goal to wholly worship God, is overshadowed by her dedication to her father and Andrei's son, Nikolai Andreivich, permanently tying her to her station at Bald Hills.

Princess Márya's religiosity and selflessness are fully encapsulated within both the individual opinions of the author himself and the corroboration of what is described as the “historically accurate” portrayal and expectations of Russian aristocratic women during the 19th century. Princess Márya's value system is upheld by Tolstoy as something to be cherished; Márya eventually finds happiness in her station within the Russian aristocracy, as if being rewarded for her toleration and Christian forgiveness.

The character that is regarded as one of Tolstoy's most personally hated throughout the entirety of the novel is the cold and society-climbing Hélène Vassilievna. This character is a personal and very intimate portrayal of a female figure in Russian aristocracy that Tolstoy vehemently opposes. His portrayal of Hélène, or at least the narrator's, is what *The Sewanee Review* regards as giving the reader “a strong impression that she is not only a heartless, soulless creature but also speechless,” for Hélène is “seldom allowed to speak for herself.”⁴ That article goes on to describe the few times Hélène does speak “as if a dummy would all of a sudden begin to speak.”⁵ Tolstoy describes her throughout the novel in ways that perfectly justify this description of her character, posing her as an essentially despicable



character whose only goal is to seduce as a means of gaining wealth and societal prevalence. Tolstoy goes as far as to allude to her and her brother Anatole engaging in incestuous acts, and he implies that her sudden death was due to an abortion complication. This decisive point directly opposes Tolstoy's view that a virtuous woman strives towards motherhood.⁶


Tolstoy's characterization of Hélène demonstrates that his beliefs concerning women and sexuality were somewhat backward even compared to contemporary belief systems. During the 19th century women's rights had become a topic of political conversation. Tolstoy voiced disdain over this concept. He would openly oppose his writing colleagues for their interpretation of female heroines in their stories, most notably in the writers' circles he attended. One of these instances took place within his “Contemporary Circle,” a group of distinguished writers in the 1850s. Within the group itself, many of the members were having flagrant affairs, with one member openly living with the wife of another. This concept clearly irked Tolstoy throughout

this time, and he began to openly criticize fellow members of this Contemporary Circle and their femme-fatale-esque characters; once stating to George Sand (a writer whom Tolstoy had previously admired) that one of his female characters “should be tied to a chariot of shame and driven through the streets of Petersburg” for her actions in Sand’s novel. This hostility and clear opposition to characters with more free-form sexuality explains why characters such as Natásha or Márya are darling to Tolstoy and earn happy conclusions, whereas characters such as Héléne are apparent antagonists who meet an unhappy ending.

The novel continues to exemplify 19th-century Russian culture alongside Tolstoy’s favored attributes for the novel’s characters with the complex character of Natásha Rostóva and her journey to becoming the child-rearing “homemaker” archetype. Throughout the novel, Natásha is seen to have the strongest and most meaningful character development as she develops from a young girl into a mother and wife. Her transformation occurs through philosophical and physical means, as Tolstoy repeatedly notes the loss of her slender physique, replaced by a far calmer, plumper, and more motherly figure. By the end of the novel, she is described as being absorbed by “her family – that is, her husband, who had to be kept in such a way as to belong entirely to her, the household; and her children, whom she had to carry, give birth to, nurse, and bring up,” directly attributing all of her focus and sense of purpose toward family maintenance.⁸ It must be noted that she is constantly described in this way in a positive light; Tolstoy shows a deep love and appreciation for the development of her character with a reverence for her dedication to not only family but also the traditional, more folklore-driven means of doing so.

Natásha’s maternal sensibilities that border the line of a more Russian-folk theme are a purposeful addition by Tolstoy, indicating his reverence for traditional Russian aesthetics. Tolstoy refers to Natásha’s final form of character with terms that are frequently used by romantic writers, relating her physique and newfound

principles in almost a quiet martyr-like form.⁹ Her spirit is meant to harken back to a folklore-related historical aspect of the Russian woman, which Tolstoy so notably revered in his most beloved characters (another example of this being Platon). He adorns Natásha with this connection to the traditional Russian spirit, as one can see in her ability to dance a Russian dance to the music of the balalaika; Tolstoy quite literally described this moment as her, a girl who was raised by a Frenchwoman, “suck[ing] this spirit in from the Russian air she breathed.”¹⁰ Tolstoy’s purposeful application of the “Russian spirit” into Natásha’s character highlights his belief of Russian folklore being a necessary characteristic for the quintessential Russian woman.



While her sensibilities may lead one to believe that her misguided nature is synonymous in some instances with that of Héléne, especially in her moment of weakness when choosing between Andrei and Anatole, Tolstoy attempts to show as clearly as possible that these are two separate forms of this somewhat-similar issue. Whereas Héléne’s constant adultery and lack of morality throughout the novel do center around her sexual prowess, it is not comparable to the

plight of Natásha. This is meant to be clear in that Héléne views these men as a means of escalating status; this means of carousing and status-climbing is done in a sexualized, uncaring way. She almost spites Pierre and is described by Tolstoy in cruel and vile wording. Natásha, on the other hand, is regarded in a way that perceives her as feeling “too much,” as opposed to Héléne’s “too little.” As Juliet Mitchell states in her chapter titled *Natásha and Héléne*, “If men can live in peace by surviving the irredeemable but life-related horrors of war, women can do so by surviving the unspeakable necessary dangers of sexuality and come through to maternity,” which is precisely the case with Natásha and her character-development in the novel.¹¹ Where Héléne’s character is portrayed negatively for her shallow and adulterous nature, Natásha’s internal struggle with two men is more so her own personal war within herself and later becomes an entire moral dilemma that alters her character irrevocably. This minor difference in character representation is an essential note to make, especially when considering Tolstoy’s own beliefs about how a woman should conduct herself. Tolstoy is concise and methodical in showing the differences between the two female characters, as well as explaining to the reader the differences between virtuous femininity and being an “erring woman.”

While in the modern age one can find Tolstoy’s views on women unnerving and offensive, Tolstoy did not intend to mark women in a negative or mocking light. His prose represents that while he holds an outdated, and at some points jarring, viewpoint towards women who do not follow 19th century social expectations (by today’s standards), he truly admires his heroic female characters, and makes this clear to the readers. We see this with Natásha, who is described as aging into motherhood, which can be viewed as “letting herself go.” Yet, Tolstoy describes her as a genuinely happy and fulfilled woman, as opposed to her once innocent and sometimes insolent younger self seen earlier in the text. At the end of the novel, both Márya and Natásha experience pure contentment

and dedication within their familial spheres, something meant to be truly fruitful experiences for female characters Tolstoy clearly admired. Tolstoy places Natásha as the soul and foundation of the household; her husband is so in love with her and so loyal to her that he is stated as “not daring, not only to flirt, but even to talk smilingly with another woman,” even bringing her on business trips out of respect and a mutual understanding of her importance.¹² While one may disagree on whether Tolstoy’s views on women are acceptable or correct, it is essential to note that he viewed the instilling of these feminine virtues in his characters with a sense of reverence and respect toward those who took on the role of motherhood or religiousness and sensibility.

Every writer is guilty of implicating their own personal value and belief systems into their work, and Tolstoy is no exception. Furthermore, Tolstoy does not attempt to claim otherwise. Tolstoy upholds these values within his novel through his main female characters, who additionally uphold the socially preferred behavior of aristocratic women. It is essential to acknowledge that the position and preferred behavior of women during the 19th century in Russia aligns with some of the most impactful female characters in the novel. Each character is representative of a different notion that consumed the Russian aristocratic woman as an aesthetic and therefore represented an entire 19th-century culture. Tolstoy makes no move to deny this and instead offers a detailed analysis of each aspect of said aristocratic women. Important pillars of these women, whether regarded with good connotations or bad, instill a sense of character development that is essential to readers and allows them to properly understand the complexities of the novel. Héléne’s sexual proclivity as a means of creating a villain, the quiet religious dignity of Márya, and the warm, calm air of Natásha as a mother and wife are all quintessential aspects of what an aristocratic 19th-century Russian woman could have been, and it is clear that both Tolstoy’s work and societal expectations of the era are indicated by these multifaceted fictional women who are so famously regarded within literature.

The End of History, Revisited: Analyzing Fukuyama Through Modern Lenses

Owen Eastman

Prominent Harvard political scientist Francis Fukuyama's 1992 work *The End of History and the Last Man* was a deeply controversial work when it first came out, with a distinctly polarizing mix of praise and scorn. Developed out of his similarly controversial 1988 essay of the same name, Fukuyama proposed that the fall of the Soviet Union and other authoritarian regimes were just the beginning of a macrohistorical shift towards democracy, a thesis which quickly came under attack due to events in the coming decades. Before we analyze what exactly went wrong in Fukuyama's line of thinking, it is important to separate what ideas Fukuyama actually espoused, and what has incorrectly been ascribed to him over the years. The contemporary perception of *The End of History* is one of ridicule, both in the academic and popular sphere, because of how strikingly wrong he appeared to be just years later. In part due to this, Fukuyama's idea has been increasingly bastardized into an unwavering assertion that the age of dictators was never to return, stripped of all his nuances and stipulations by his critics. This paper will begin by outlining the basic ideas crucial in understanding *The End of History* before identifying three main issues with Fukuyama's ideas: his thesis places too little emphasis on cultural factors, too much emphasis on economic factors, and is overall wrapped up too much in the zeitgeist of the early 1990s.

Fukuyama begins by placing his rhetoric firmly in the idea of a "universal history," beginning with Immanuel Kant's proto-conception of history as a rational agent that moves in a given direction before reaching an endpoint in progression. He places special importance on the ideas of philosopher Alexander Kojeve, who

reworked the ideas of G.W.F. Hegel and his "universal history" through the lens of the emergence of modern totalitarianism. Engaging in a directional, narrative history like this causes great rifts with critics who believe that history is absurd, incomprehensible, or without pattern, which has often been the most salient angle of attack in scholarly responses. For instance, popular Marxist writer Freddie deBoer takes greatest issue with Fukuyama for "failing to understand the merciless advance of history and how it ceaselessly grinds up humanity's feeble attempts at macrohistoric understanding."¹


For a universal theory of history to hold credence, one first must identify some universal characteristic of humanity aligned towards a central goal. In identifying this, Fukuyama borrows Plato's concept of the thymotic part of the soul, the part which desires recognition and greatness, as the driver of human history. Left unchecked or unhealthily maintained, thymos can lead to the rise of authoritarianism and power-hungry dictators. Fukuyama argues that the fall of the Soviet Union ushered in a new era of liberal democracy, as it was the optimal framework in which humans could express their thymotic desires in a safe and controlled manner. In the case of liberal democracy, Fukuyama pointed to economic acquisition as a means of satisfying thymos and achieving recognition by others, a far safer or more stable alternative than war or revolution. After making a case for this driver of human history, Fukuyama concludes by proposing the idea of the "last man," a generation



whose thymotic desires would be satisfied by the mechanisms of everyday democratic society, rendering political upheaval stagnant. This is where the "end of history" idea comes in—by asserting that liberal democracy best satisfies the universal thymotic conditions of man, there will be no more impetus for war, upheaval, or other instruments of vast historical change. This is directly contrasted in the epilogue with the Nietzschean "first man," an agent of revolutionary change who grows dissatisfied with the status quo and threatens to upend the "end of history."

Now that the central argument has clearly been laid out, we shall find the points of legitimate critique which remain in an objective reading of Fukuyama's work. One of the largest issues on this front was his assessment of the extent to which government, politics, and economics could properly satisfy thymos—Fukuyama's main flaw, then, was placing less emphasis on the sociological or cultural factors which shaped one's life. This division of people among more personal lines can be best understood through the Madisonian

conception of faction, broadly defined as a coalition around religion or class. Though these factions are certainly not inherently undemocratic or illiberal, Madison goes so far as to claim in "Federalist Paper #10" that mediating faction is the most important facet in creating a democracy: of the powers that a governmental system may have, he says that "none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction."² Fukuyama himself seems to understand the danger that this poses, noting that "the desire for recognition is also the psychological seat of two extremely powerful passions—religion and nationalism," and later going on to claim that "conflicts over 'values' are potentially much more deadly than conflicts over material possessions or wealth."³ Madison, however, also recognized that a republic which pursued the destruction of faction too harshly would cease to become a republic at all, choosing instead to erect institutional guardrails to mitigate the damage faction may be able to do. Fukuyama argues that globalizing factors gradually phase out distinct cultural identity, reducing the ability to form factions and threaten democracy. With this supposed, he holds the notion that everyone will value the same things in the economic sense via the universal human characteristic of the thymotic soul, but this is not enough to broadly paint democratization as uniform. To Fukuyama, culture "arises out of the capacity to evaluate, to say for instance that the person who defers to his elders is worthy, or that the human being who eats unclean animals like pigs is not."⁴ By his own definition, it is difficult to fully conceive how economics would replace this, as humans do not latch on to a singular evaluative metric in assessing worth to anything. Fukuyama further attempts to spin faction as something which could be a net positive in social development, citing moral reform efforts of Christians in the nineteenth century as an example of this. "If the health of contemporary liberal democracy rests on the health of civil society, and the latter depends on people's spontaneous ability to associate," Fukuyama concludes, "then it is clear that liberalism must not reach beyond its own principles to succeed."⁵



Two and a half centuries removed from the writings of Madison, factions have become even more prevalent in society than Fukuyama assumed, as modernized systems of communication allow for like-minded thinkers to easily connect with each other. Algorithmic systems of the internet push content driven to satisfy and reinforce one's beliefs, leading to the formation of echo chambers and increasing relative intolerance towards the views of others. The issue especially arises when a faction is evangelical in nature (not necessarily in the religious sense, but in the belief that one's way of living should be actively spread to others), as they are naturally prone to behaving in ways that may marginalize other groups. Taking these ideas out of abstraction, several real-life cases emerge from the historical record, and one need look no further than Richard Hofstadter's "paranoid style" in American politics to understand this. Hofstadter cites Norman Cohn's belief that the paranoid style is derived from "the megalomaniac view of oneself as the Elect, wholly good, abominably persecuted, yet assured of ultimate triumph."⁶ The religious rhetoric used here is no accident: paranoid American conservatism has often been intertwined with evangelicalism, from the anti-Catholic fervor of the nineteenth century to the atheism of communism. This perceived erosion of white evangelical heritage allows for them to construe any threat as existential. In responding to this, regard for democratic proceedings may go out the window entirely, justified by extraordinary times which call for extraordinary measures. Hofstadter himself concludes as much, as "certain historical catastrophes or frustrations may be conducive to the release of such psychic energies, and to situations in which they can more readily be built into mass movements or political parties."⁷ The election of Obama, for instance, represented a critical point in this psyche of the paranoid, as many white evangelicals could no longer visibly self-identify with the leader of a historically white-controlled country. Fukuyama himself acknowledged towards the end of his book: "No regime is able to satisfy all men in all places," he says, as "dissatisfaction arises where democracy has triumphed most completely: it is

a dissatisfaction *with* liberty and equality. Thus those who remain dissatisfied will always have the potential to restart history."⁸

Another issue which affected Fukuyama's conclusion was his incorrect presupposition that the "winners" of free-market democracies were benign to the health of a civilization. Fukuyama seems to worry about tyranny of the government too much in relation to potential tyranny of an imbalanced economy—there are instances where even the most optimal liberal democracy can fall victim to oligopolistic practices which stratify society into "haves" and "have-nots." Maintaining such a balance is a crucial part of democratic health: in political scientist Bernard Crick's *Democracy: A Very Short Introduction*, several conditions of democracy are listed, one of which is a "typical social structure," in that "extremes of wealth in the hands of a few can threaten democratic processes."⁹ From this, faction can arise out of class lines, where we often see authoritarian leaders step in and take control in these brief situations of chaos or panic. Take the contemporary example of Hungary, for instance: Viktor Orban and the Fidesz party were able to grab power from the Socialists in 2010 due to short-term dissatisfaction with the ruling party's inability to stem the tide of growing wealth inequality and properly manage the 2008 market crash.

Fukuyama fails to see the most salient effects of class-based upheaval. Towards the end of the book, he brushes away fears of modern revolution by asserting that "it does not strike me that we face the problem of an excess of *megalothymia*. Those earnest young people trooping off to law and business school ... seem to be much more in danger of becoming last men, rather than reviving the passions of the first man."¹⁰ This assessment implies that the smartest and most well-educated would be the likely agents of revolution, which is unlikely given the nature of contemporary revolutions since the publishing of the book. If change does indeed stem from dissatisfaction with the system, it naturally follows that the elite would be most insulated from revolutionary, anti-democratic thought for two reasons. First, economic recessions hit



those with the least existing capital the hardest. The status quo is created by the establishment, ergo the status quo is most likely to benefit the establishment and maintain their hold on power. If any dissatisfaction within this group does arise, the most well-educated are also far more likely to already be in positions of power where institutional change can be achieved through democratic means, not violent revolution.

The seeds of democratic decay over the past few decades have not been sown directly by the intelligentsia, but out of a reaction against the intelligentsia by the working class, fearful that their culture, way of life, and other artifacts were being displaced. In part, the intelligentsia are complicit in this undermining of the system because of their inability to recognize the fundamental fact of populism. Fukuyama's thought does not sufficiently address this concern initially—he seems to have given the common people far too much credit in their ability to consistently choose long-term, pragmatic policy over short-term benefit or their ability to resist the siren song of demagogic populism. Perhaps he believed that the modernization of education

would be enough to sufficiently correct these errors in belief.

Fukuyama's low value on culture and confidence in capitalism are only further exacerbated by the prevailing attitudes of the time. The book is built on the foundation of neoconservatism—America had just emerged from the Reagan era in which the forces of capitalism had triumphed over central planning with some degree of finality. The fall of the Soviet Union, however, did not necessarily mean that any of these factors necessary in building democracy had been vanquished forever. Fukuyama himself was one of the most prominent members of this generation of neoconservatives, but his political predispositions began to shift as subsequent events unfolded. "A lot of the neo-conservatives drew the wrong lessons from the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism," Fukuyama himself admitted in a 2006 interview with *Der Spiegel*, as he claims that they "generalized from the event that all totalitarian regimes are basically hollow at the core and if you give them a little push from the outside, they're going to collapse."¹¹ Fukuyama further distanced himself from the

neoconservatives as he began to sense worrying trends within the American system of governance, renouncing the movement entirely after the election of Trump.

We have a rather large amount of documentation regarding this shift in Fukuyama's views due to the afterwords he wrote in subsequent reprintings of *The End of History* (one in 2006, the other in 2016). The article in *Der Spiegel* mentioned earlier, published the same year as his first revision, further reflects his changing belief, as he asserts that the education of people to embrace democracy was not a foregone conclusion. "We are engaged basically in a battle for the hearts and minds of the people—a struggle over ideas," he said, contending that a "struggle between the ideas of a pluralistic, democratic modern society versus theocracy" had recently emerged.¹² He further abandons any concept of an inevitable Hegelian end of history in his first afterword, stating that "weak determinism means that in the face of broad historical trends,



statesmanship, politics, leadership, and individual choice remain absolutely critical to the actual course of historical development."¹³ These ideas are most fully fleshed out in Fukuyama's subsequent 2011 and 2014 works, *The Origins of Political Order* and *Political Order and Political Decay*. In reflecting on this in his 2016 afterword, he stresses "the importance of modern states to development, as well as the immense difficulties involved in creating them, and the idea of political decay, where societies go backwards

as well as forwards."¹⁴ This qualification of his initial argument was inspired by the authoritarian tailslides of China and Russia (both states that seemed to be liberalizing at the start of the 1990s), as well as the increased political polarization in the United States. "Populism, on the other hand," he concludes, "is arguably a much more serious threat to global democracy because it has appeared in the very heartland of democratic practice."¹⁵

Ultimately, the largest issue with Fukuyama's perspective is that he did not think like a sociologist, and instead placed heavier emphasis on broader macroeconomic and political theory. The book is inevitably a product of his time: within the short-term context of the fall of communism and the triumph of the West, his thesis seemed like a natural conclusion. We must, however, be careful not to engage in the same fallacies by assuming that our recent shift back towards totalitarianism is irreversible. The rise of nationalist and populist sentiment has brought about a spate of "the sky is falling" prognoses from modern political scientists, but when we ask the question of "is democracy dying?" our words carry the assumptions of death being a permanent, irreversible state. To anthropomorphize democracy as something that can die is to ascribe lazy, imprecise language to it: as George Orwell notes in his essay *Politics and the English Language*, metaphors "will construct your sentences for you – even think your thoughts for you, to a certain extent – and at need they will perform the important service of partially concealing your meaning even from yourself."¹⁶ If we are to reject the Hegelian view of history that Fukuyama espoused, and instead construe it as cyclical or random entirely, then claiming the death of democracy now is just as nonsensical as claiming the death of totalitarianism after the fall of the Soviets.

Japanese Modernization and Cultural Globalization: Western Influence in Nineteenth-Century Japan

Andrew Hiner

Comodore Matthew Perry, after positioning his naval guns towards Edo bay in 1853, presented Japanese officials with a letter and a white flag. The letter stated that "in the event the Japanese elected war rather than negotiation," they should use the flag to surrender, as "victory would naturally belong to the Americans."¹ The message was clear: Japan must open trade with the United States or face defeat. Japan relented to these threats. The ensuing trade with the Western world would mark the end of centuries of cultural isolationism and result in rapid political and social developments throughout the nation. The Edo Period (1603-1867), characterized by a system of regional feudal rule under the Tokugawa Shogunate,² soon gave way to the Meiji Restoration (1867-1912), a cultural revolution that saw Japan do away with its feudal order and assert its position as a global power.³ As a result of this extreme response to foreign intervention, Japan experienced a relatively rapid process of modernization when compared to many Western nations. Though the nation had remained isolated for generations, their social developments during the Meiji period reveal the strong influence of Western thought on this cultural reorientation. By seeking to empower Japan and protect against Western control, the Meiji Restoration ultimately borrowed many Western systems of governance and economics. Both the speed and chaos of this development speak to the characteristic globalization of the late nineteenth century, as Japan was forced to confront its position on the international stage.

Although Japan's greatest social reforms occurred during the Meiji Restoration, there was a notable complexity of pre-existing attitudes

towards modernization in the isolationist Edo era. Even under the feudal Tokugawa government, some elements of Japanese society were already incorporating reformist and modernized ideas, specifically in regards to economic systems and religious education. Saburō Ienaga, in his 1965 article on Japanese modernization and Buddhism, argues that "the drive towards modernization had already begun" in Japan despite its status as a "classical feudal society," due precisely to the complexities of its economic and educational systems.⁴ Though the feudal system enforced strict economic hierarchies, Saburō highlights the emerging "money economy" and the increased social mobility it offered to citizens, presenting "serious inconsistencies" within Japan's ostensibly rigid system.⁵ Likewise, new schools of thought emerged surrounding the established Confucian tradition, offering more "reformist" education from scholars who combined Confucianism with their "own logic."⁶ Economic and religious expectations were moving away from centralized feudalism and towards individual thought and expression, even during the late pre-modern period. Though the nation relied on traditional political and social relations, the Edo period was nonetheless permeated by certain modern sentiments. In this sense, Japanese society demonstrated an inclination towards modernist thought before the advancements of the Meiji period.

In spite of these early reforms, the changes made under the new Meiji government came about as a direct reaction to Western intervention. While the expressed motivation of the United States was simply the opening of trade with Japan, with President Franklin Pierce extending



his “good wishes” and ensuring that the US would respect Japanese laws and customs,⁷ their display of military force pressured the nation into opening trade. Michio Kitahara, in his piece “Commodore Perry and the Japanese: A Study in the Dramaturgy of Power,” notes the “tactics of power display” and veiled threats regarding European colonization that were used to force the Japanese to sign with the US, giving them outsized access to the nation’s economy.⁸ Though many officials yielded to these demands, if unwillingly, not all were pleased with this new arrangement. In their book *A History of Japan*, Richard Mason and C. J. Caiger discuss the “humiliation and culture shock” brought on by these “one-sided” treaties made with the United States.⁹ A number of Japanese retaliated against the growing cultural influence from abroad. Politicians publicly voiced “anti-foreign” sentiments, and many *ronin*, the masterless

samurai class characteristic of the preceding Edo period, threatened terrorism and even staged rebellions against the new government.¹⁰ Japan had been introduced to foreign influences to an extent greater than they had witnessed in centuries, and the resulting chaos illustrated an internal contest to preserve Japan’s traditional culture. Despite the impositions made by Western powers and objections from many traditional Japanese, the nation sought to assert its political agency by adapting to these new international responsibilities, with the Meiji government’s modern reforms intending to retain Japan’s political agency.

Though Japan’s modernization did strengthen its government and economy in opposition to Western nations, their specific reforms ultimately borrowed heavily from Western culture and politics. The first major development was the reinstatement of the

imperial system, undoing the period of shogunate rule and establishing Emperor Meiji as chief authority in the nation.¹¹ This large-scale reform was prompted primarily by young samurai and nobles, who felt that this new Western trade demanded a narrowing of political power.¹² As Mason and Caiger state, the return to “centralized monarchy” was an effort to provide “effective rule” on a national level, making Japan a formidable nation state in the modern world.¹³ Though this change was a return to the political structure of ancient Japan, it mirrored many of the Western powers at the time. This desire for the strength of monarchical rule emulated the monarchies which governed imperialist nations such as Britain and Russia.¹⁴ Japan’s political reform extended beyond the emperor as well, with the government adopting more constitutional measures for legislation. As Japan restructured their political system, they replaced their order of regional daimyo vassals with parliamentary rule. Like with the reinstated imperial power, this new “Diet” parliamentary system borrowed heavily from British structures of government and their separation of powers.¹⁵ These changes illustrated not only a movement away from the feudal order and towards greater national power, but they all borrowed from Western systems of government.

Along with these political reforms, the economic transformations of the Meiji Restoration likewise emulated a Western model. As Robert Ward argues in his article “Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan,” the modern economies of the nineteenth century were characterized by “mechanization, industrialization,” and the “specialization and professionalization of labor.”¹⁶ As such, a modernizing nation necessitates new systems of manufacturing and labor in order to improve its economic production and standard of living. The Meiji Restoration seized this model in order to strengthen its national prowess, and Japan began promoting industrialization along with furthering advances in the pre-existing agricultural spheres.¹⁷ There was a growing emphasis on private economic dynasties, which were large family corporations that covered a variety of economic

industries.¹⁸ Each of these developments signified a change from the feudal, agricultural economy of the Edo period towards one which could rival other modern nations around the globe. This movement towards capitalistic business models once again signified Japan’s integration of Western philosophies. As with their political reforms, Japan’s economic modernization established Japan as a more competitive nation-state while still adopting foreign economic models.

Japan’s sudden reordering of their society, abandoning their isolationist system in less than a decade, serves as a case study in the widespread globalization of the nineteenth century. Though these political and economic developments adapted Western systems in order to fit within Japan’s specific cultural framework, the Meiji Restoration nonetheless integrated Japan into the modern Western landscape. This could be viewed as an extension of those existing reformist tendencies of the Edo period detailed earlier, but the specific emulation of Western philosophies ensures that it was not an isolated, internal movement. This integration of the West could imply that globalization brought with it more acceptance towards homogenization. Satoshi Machida’s article “Does Globalization Render People More Ethnocentric? Globalization and People’s Views on Cultures” states that global trade potentially leads to “hybridization” and a society that is “more tolerant” of outside influences.¹⁹ The Meiji Restoration’s specific development would appear to support this tolerance of foreign cultures. However, much of what compelled these reforms can also be credited to Japan’s rejection of the West, endeavoring to strengthen the nation by adopting successful economies and governments. Though the rebellions were ultimately squashed, the internal objections from more traditionalist Japanese further emphasize this opposition to American encroachment. Nonetheless, Japan’s quick integration of modern politics and philosophies following the opening of trade illustrated the necessity for nations to modernize if they wished to compete with other global powers during the



nineteenth century.

In instituting a number of modern reforms that strengthened Japan's national prowess, precisely in opposition to Western control, Japan ultimately co-opted many Western systems of politics and economics. Recognizing the necessity to become an industrial power, the Meiji empire sought out successful forms of government and remodeled them to function within Japanese society. This did not necessarily constitute a clean break from pre-modern Japan, as it built on certain modern ideas from the Edo-era while preserving various elements of Japan's traditional culture. However, this did mark a new era for Japan as a globalized, imperial power. Japan's growth as an industrial and imperial force would culminate in their expansion and defeat during the Second World War, but this model found its roots in the Western empires of the late nineteenth century. Whether the result of a greater acceptance towards foreign cultures or preexisting modern sentiments, Japan's efforts to preserve its power and agency in response to the West resulted in the nation being driven by many Western systems of government and economics.

Russia, Ukraine, and the Ghosts of a Bloody Century: An Analysis of Field Reporting by Russia Today

Lincoln Harder

The ongoing war in Ukraine has been a contentious and pressing issue in global politics since the invasion began on the morning of February 24, 2022. Coverage of the battlefield was prolific in the initial stages of the war and formed the basis of competing theories, quickly gaining traction in public discourse, as to why Vladimir Putin's Russia had made such a brazen move. Coinciding with this speculation was a wide array of retaliatory measures from allies of Ukraine in NATO and the legacy Western bloc. Economic sanctions, convictions in the International Criminal Court, and media censorship were leveraged heavily, severing connections between the West and the titan of Eurasia in an effort to deter further advances into Ukrainian territory. The result of these tandem events has been the wide dissemination of exclusively Western narratives on Russian aggression and general ignorance of the official Russian position.

While this may appear rational, as any Russian publication is guaranteed to conform to rigorous state propaganda initiatives, the inaccessibility of the Kremlin-sanctioned perspective prevents the average observer from seeing the conflict in a more complete context. What might justify such an invasion in Putin's eyes, the type of narratives that Putin sees as advantageous to spread abroad, and some legitimate beliefs held by Russians in the embattled region are all absent from the Western press yet can all be readily observed in publications from Russian state-media. For this reason, this analysis examines field reports from the war in Ukraine published by Russia Today (RT), a Kremlin-owned media company, in an effort to clarify the official narrative and intentions of the Russian Federation as directed to a Western



audience.¹ Russia Today is an international publication that provides commentary on Russian and world news. It is entirely funded by the Russian state and publishes stories in English, German, French, Arabic, and Spanish that follow carefully vetted narratives. The agency professes to offer an alternative perspective and presents itself as an objective but provocative outlet.²

Given that the quantity of content published by Russia Today is substantial, the body of this analysis examines exclusively video field reports from within Ukrainian territory, published during the first twenty days of the conflict, that contain an element of commentary. After controlling for quality and relevance, twenty seven short videos amounting to ninety minutes of footage were chosen for analysis. Each video was coded according to its constituent parts with background music, transitional imagery, camera perspective, commentary, setting, emotional tone, and choice of topics each being assessed for the ways in which they influence the gestalt of the Russian narrative. Initially, notable elements were characterized by emotional significance, emphasized topics, strong rhetoric, overt blaming, and general narrative framing. Over the course of the coding process, the following categories

formed, into which observations could be neatly organized:

- *Presentations of Luhansk and Donetsk residents as the primary victims of the conflict.*
- *Portrayals of the Russian invasion as a liberation or peacemaking initiative.*
- *Displays of Ukrainian military or governmental incompetence and cowardice.*
- *Calls for de-Nazification and accusations of Ukrainian support for neo-Nazis.*
- *Demonstrations of the effectiveness and benevolence of the Russian military.*

Other notable observations that do not adhere specifically to these points are worked into the analysis more generally, but the consistency with which the near entirety of observations could be sorted into these specific categories lends credibility to their use. As a result, these categories that coalesced throughout the coding process form the basic structure of this analysis.

Given that this conflict began with the Russian recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as autonomous nations, it is also fitting that the Russian media began their coverage by accusing Ukraine of attacking and displacing the people of these breakaway republics. While music was rarely a part of these dispatches, a somber tune accompanied the photos of shaken women and children alongside montages of small cats and dogs among smoking rubble.³ The effect of this presentation is to convey the innocence of these people, who are then interviewed about how they have been displaced, separated from families, and terrorized by Ukrainian shelling since the initial conflict in 2014.⁴ Other reports interview families as they drive towards the Russian border in cars marked with the Russian word for children (дети) while black smoke fills the sky behind



them; no doubt from the crumbling remains of villages that are shown throughout the reports.⁵ Notably, there is an absence of any car using the Ukrainian spelling (дітей). Despite whole families moving in this exodus, only women and children are interviewed by the reporter, and when asked why they are fleeing, a very young girl replies, “We are trying to save ourselves.”⁶ Another report interviews Kirill, a ten-year-old boy from Donetsk, who was hit by shrapnel. He tells the reporter that the blast killed twenty others.⁷ These dispatches all present a carefully crafted throughline of innocent people bearing the consequences of Ukrainian counterattacks. In the words of one RT reporter, the Ukrainian military is bombing the “cities they once ruled” and “firing in revenge” as they retreat.⁸ This framing suggests that not only does Ukraine harm the innocent women and children of Donetsk and Luhansk, but in Russia’s annals of the war, it does so as a vengeful deposed tyrant. This perspective emphasizes the artificiality with which Russia views the Ukrainian state by demonstrating that the Ukrainian government prioritizes its own control over the well-being of Russian-speaking people in Eastern Ukraine. Such permissiveness of civilian casualties and the apparent lack of any support for those finding themselves on the front lines also suggest a significant rift between the people and their government.

Naturally, Russia is eager to assert itself as the hero of this regicidal narrative. A long-separated Russian soldier embraces his parents living in the Donbass as they weep, the mother lamenting their time apart before they celebrate their reunion with a meal as a family.⁹ Such scenes frame the Russian advance as a reunification effort for the ethnic Russians in east Ukraine who can now live in their own country. In the south near Crimea, another report proclaims the restoration of fresh water supply to Crimea after the Russian forces seized a dam which they now “defend from nationalists” and use to provide locals with power and water. Civilians walk their dogs with their children across the dam, and the canal fills with water as the hydroelectric generators roar.¹⁰ Restoring order and necessary utilities appears, therefore, to be a major purpose

of this “special military operation.” In one village, amidst construction workers clearing rubble and soldiers standing guard, a worker on a boom lift rises toward a tattered scrap of a Ukrainian flag framed against the sky, which he removes, tears to pieces, and scatters into the wind.¹¹ The reporter proclaims that the people there are eager to forget the painful memories of the last eight years under Ukrainian rule.¹² The disdain for Ukraine and cheerful tone expressed in these reports places the Russian military in the position of a liberator, restoring order, providing for the people, and creating hope for a once oppressed community.

For further justification of the invasion, Russia Today has been anything but subtle in its attempts to debase the current Ukrainian military and government. The defensive situation in Kiev is properly described as desperate. The reporters comment on the arming of civilians and collective grass-roots initiatives to halt the Russian advance. However, instead of a patriotic victory for Ukraine, they report this government-sponsored activity as support for anarchy and lawlessness.¹³ One report claims over stills of shattered windows and heavily barricaded storefronts that 30,000 firearms and 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition have been distributed without any precaution, resulting in armed looters and guerilla squads terrorizing the surrounding areas.¹⁴ A later report from the same region claims that prisoners have been released and allowed to arm themselves.¹⁵ Another, broadcast from within an advancing Russian column, accuses the Ukrainian defense forces of positioning in residential apartment blocks, “using women and children as human shields.”¹⁶

Near the Black Sea, a dispatch accompanies a brigade of Russian soldiers as they plunder a small fleet of Ukrainian military ships, abandoned and left fully operational. Half-finished meals, empty beer bottles, discarded belongings, and military equipment are held as a testament to the fear and speed with which the Ukrainians abandoned their posts.¹⁷ A near identical broadcast shows much of the same from a base that once housed the most “elite Ukrainian units,” now burned with valuable documents and equipment visibly left behind.¹⁸

The seized equipment is then seen being issued to the Donetsk People’s Republic forces to further crush Ukrainian morale. The reporter also offers one final insult in a comment suggesting that President Zelenskyy spoke with the USA “from his bunker” as a coward who hides from conflict.¹⁹ A smug attitude forms the overarching tone of these reports, and although RT claims the Ukrainians were already demoralized, it is clear that they are eager to bolster that sentiment.

The second major line of attack against Ukraine comes in the form of the push for denazification. The majority of Russian losses admitted by RT are claimed to be the handiwork of Ukraine’s neo-Nazi or nationalist battalions.²⁰ In two separate accounts, journalists visit an outpost of the group Aidar, which they stress has been trained by NATO forces despite their inclusion on the same extremist indexes as ISIS and the Taliban for alleged war crimes.²¹ One reporter interviews a man who was held prisoner at the base. He recounts the torture he experienced while scenes of cramped makeshift punishment cells and fortified buildings are filmed through strands of barbed wire.²² Another comments on the framed photos of Nazi collaborators that hang on the walls.²³ Curiously, the rhetoric of routing the neo-Nazi groups is spoken over a montage of landmarks from both Washington D.C. and Kiev mixed with footage of the Azov battalion and Nazi salutes.²⁴ Clearly, this is an allusion to what the Russian government perceives to be collaboration between the United States and Ukraine’s neo-Nazi groups. The reporter also recited the metaphor of the “Russian bear” coming up against a fascist threat to evoke the same patriotic struggle as its Soviet predecessor.²⁵ To this end, one striking piece of imagery presents a solemn gathering of civilians at a war memorial in the captured city of Kherson that was built to commemorate the city’s 1944 liberation from the Nazis.²⁶ Individuals flanking the monument carry the flags of the Soviet Union. In doing so, the Russian forces not only honor and uphold the memory of a victory that legitimizes their sense of needed Slavic unity, but also co-opt its moral justification through the resurrection of the “Great Patriotic War” against fascism.



With the Ukrainian forces painted as cruel Nazis and incompetent cowards, Russia Today provides a convenient antithesis to the effective and generous Russian army. In combat, the Russian forces appear in freshly issued, matching uniforms with their faces covered and in tight formation, sharply contrasted against the irregularity of the Ukrainian defense forces. A report from a helicopter refueling station films the speed and professionalism with which the Russian air force is maintained while the reporter comments on the precision of the air-to-air missiles they are equipped with.²⁷ Doubtless, this forms an attempt to shrug off claims of indiscriminate bombardment. In the cities, however, the face coverings disappear. Smiling soldiers, often unarmed, hand out crates of food and supplies in Kherson and Melitopol to orderly queues of thankful citizens in a pristine city square.²⁸ Elderly women in heavy winter clothing comment on the lack of food as their bags are filled by Russian infantry. Another report contrasts footage in short alternating sequences. Half depict rallies in Kiev, where the neo-Nazi Azov battalion marches in red and black smoke with flags bearing the black sun or the wolfsangel (a stylized replacement for the swastika and a runic symbol for liberty, respectively, both designed by the Nazi SS).²⁹ The remainder contains a Russian military column helping the elderly and infirm cross a bridge destroyed by Ukraine in their retreat.³⁰ The same ultra-nationalists and fascists are blamed as the “handful of spoilers” that Russian troops hold at a distance for harassing citizens who choose to accept aid.³¹ A Russian commander explains that not everyone is happy to see them in Ukraine. Some are afraid or hesitant, but the Russians are eager to change their minds. In the background, children chase each other in the courtyard while soldiers unload food from “Z” emblazoned

trucks.³² One dispatch ends with a signoff overlaid on a long shot of the Ukrainian flag still flying above the Kherson government building.³³ This follows an assertion from the reporter that Russia is not at war with Ukraine or its people but with the corrupt government and nationalist elements that have ceased state control.

This examination of what can only be described as propaganda journalism provides a vastly different framing of the conflict than has been presented by Western media. Based on the findings of this analysis, the Russian message to the West frames the ‘special military operation’ as not only being justified but necessary to save the Ukrainian people from their state’s moral corruption and dangerous incompetence. Like the Red Army before them, the Russian forces are now waging a war of virtue against a fascist threat that oppresses their fellow Slavs. While the extreme position that underlies these dispatches is obviously more of a political cudgel than a reality, it should also provoke skepticism about the coverage received in the Western world.

Propaganda is as viable a tool of the media in the West as it is in Eastern Europe. Through the suppression of unfavorable media and reliance on censorship to maintain official narratives, states risk an incomplete understanding of their competitors and an ill-informed public opinion on gravely relevant issues. This analysis should bring into question the narratives that surround this conflict from all sides. The alternative range of historical and ideological factors at play and the sincerely held beliefs of people embroiled in the fighting, as laid out above, cannot be reasonably reconciled with the archetypal good versus evil dichotomy that each side claims. Instead, it must be recognized that the only label that can clearly be put on participants is that of victims failed by their neighbors, governments, and countrymen. As it continues to define the international political landscape going forward, the destruction of Eastern Ukraine will not be remembered as a necessary moment in a grand national narrative by those whose lives it has torn asunder. Rather, it will live on through the wounds inflicted against European peace and in our minds as a tragedy reminiscent of the 20th-century.

Can the Philosopher Be a Christian: Examining the Relationship of Faith to the Philosophic Life

Raleigh Adams

It is the conventionally and popularly held belief that faith and reason are opposites, that the one is irreconcilable with the other. However, this polemical view creates a skewing effect, both in the academy and in society on the whole, to either the extreme end of faith or that of reason. However, upon the survey of a variety of philosophers and thinkers, largely from the Christian tradition, this interconnection of faith and philosophy appears to possess far more nuance and blending than is apparent on the surface. Very rarely can human beings survive in extremes. The truth often lies in the middle, and thus the ground between the life of reason and the life of piety must be unearthed. This line of questioning and the potential answers that may follow hold great gravity not only for modern political and social relations, but for the deeper health of the human soul as well. The works of Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, G.E.M. Anscombe, and C.S. Lewis shed light on whether a philosopher can also be a Christian. These texts will be used to examine whether faith and reason are mutually exclusive or if they highlight and heighten one another instead.

Aquinas - Summa Theologica

The first and earliest of the philosophers to offer guidance in the relationship between reason and faith is Thomas Aquinas. His *Summa Theologica* creates a picture of the life of the Christian that encourages, if not requires, reason and philosophy.

In the second question of the second book of the second part, Aquinas addresses questions surrounding the act of faith. Article III,

whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason, is the most pertinent to the act of philosophy and how the activity interacts with the spiritual aspects of the human being.¹ This article considers whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason given to every human being.² The objections Aquinas lists contrast with Hebrews 11:6, which states, “Without faith it is impossible to please God.” Aquinas proposes an alternative that “whenever one nature is subordinate to another, we find that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature, one of which is in respect of that nature’s proper movement, while the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature.”³ According to its nature, water moves to the center of the earth, while according to the nature of the moon, water moves around the center by ebb and flow. Natures, therefore, are inversely related.

The created rational nature is subordinate to God, as created creatures do not attain to the universal, but instead to the particular. The rational creature, man, comes farthest of all living and non-living things to the divine. However, as the only rational creature, “in as much as [he] apprehends the universal notion of good and being, [man] is immediately related to the universal principle of being.”⁴ Similarly, the perfection of the rational creature is not limited to that which belongs to its nature, but also that which it acquires through “a supernatural participation of the Divine goodness.”⁵ Man participates in this otherworldly learning little by little, and he who learns must believe, in order that he may learn and acquire license to a perfect degree. If this science is pertaining to God, then it

behooves a man to believe in God so that he may attain a perfect vision of heavenly happiness.⁶ Man's nature is dependent upon a higher nature, with some supernatural knowledge and teacher needed to reach perfection. Sirach 3:23 is used here to state that "Many things are shown to thee above the understandings of man." This highlights the imperfections of man's natural reason, and how he needs divine assistance to reach the highest understanding and happiness.

In review of these selections from Aquinas' work, perhaps most significant to the question of the relationship between faith and philosophy is his aforementioned conception of knowledge and natural reason as "preambles to the articles" of faith. Faith presupposes natural knowledge, according to Aquinas, making the two inherently combined. To Aquinas, then, man must be both a philosopher and being of faith. It is the capacity for philosophy and reason that enables man to accept faith at all.

G.E.M. Anscombe - Faith in a Hard Ground

G.E.M. Anscombe's work, published after WWI and WWII, reflects the impact of both wars on humanity's relationship to and understanding of the world as well as humanity's understanding of the divine. Anscombe's work reconciles the effects of a post-Enlightenment world and returns to the truths that Kant and other similar figures cast aside.

In her chapter "Faith," Anscombe contrasts faith and knowledge, saying the latter "would be knowledge by proofs intrinsic to the subject matter, not by proofs from someone's having said these things were true. For matters which were strictly of 'faith' intrinsic proofs were not possible, and that was why faith contrasted with 'knowledge.'"⁷

Faith, then, is concerned



with what is declared to be true. Matters of faith are not true on their own merit, but from the power infused and given to them. Conversely, knowledge, that which can be found via philosophy and reason, is concerned with truths that are self-evident. Anscombe declares faith as that which "the Christian adds that such a belief is sometimes the truth, and that the consequent belief is only then what he means by faith."⁸ Faith is what we have knowledge of, and then, what individuals declare as true. Contrary to Aquinas, Anscombe demonstrates an anthropocentric impulse. She understands faith not as a result of witnessing God's works and being imbued with belief from them, but rather initiating that faith from within oneself.

For Anscombe, philosophers play a unique role in interaction with the divine. No other genre or trade possesses ancient sources reflecting on matters of faith. She writes, "Now for my question: was reflection on the divine only done by philosophers? Or should we see Homer and Hesiod as the holy books of the Greeks? Or is there a lost literature connected with the Mysteries?"⁹ It is Anscombe's description of the ancient philosopher, perhaps including figures like Homer and Hesiod, that is of the most interest in the question of faith and reason. Her philosophy could possibly bridge the gap between Kant and those critical of faith with those who are zealous and fundamentalist. Anscombe's philosophy is hard to find in modernity: "To those who think they have no religion at all, in the U.S.A. for example, it is a frequent fixed opinion that everything they identify as religion is *eo ipso* superstition,"¹⁰ making the philosopher Anscombe describes feel like a figment of the past.

Anscombe finishes the essay by describing the final distinctions between the believer, the pagan, and the philosopher:

The philosophic form which I have described does by contrast have a fair amount of thought in it. My purpose has been to point to it as an expression of what I showed as the heart of actual historical and present paganism: namely having and respecting the various worships of many gods and hating the exclusiveness of the true religion. That exclusiveness branded the ancient Jews as atheists, enemies of the gods. For our philosophic pagans there is no

*such thing as the true religion or the true god; the many religions can perhaps be like many pearls on a string. That one string which each religion may be hung on, is something rich and significant in the depths of the self. All peoples have gods and it is contemptible to be scornful of them for this: what matters is whether there is this depth (of religion) in a man's heart."*¹¹

It is Anscombe's philosophic pagan that is the most hopeful figure when questioning the relationship between reason and faith. The pagan, or in the world post-Kant, the person who sees religion as "*eo ipso* superstition," exists on one end of the spectrum of philosophy and faith. The follower of the "true religion" exists on the other end. While the philosophic pagan lacks any true religion or god, as they are committed to the pursuit of truth, this person is also uniquely able to walk between the two aforementioned camps. The chapter ultimately finishes on the parting note that it is the "depth of religion in man's heart" that matters. To Anscombe, it is the feeling of religion that is of the utmost importance.

C.S. Lewis - Mere Christianity

C.S. Lewis' *Mere Christianity* concludes this examination. In a collection of 20th-century apologetic essays (transcribed and added to from his radio show), Lewis proposes two pertinent ideas to the question of the relation between faith and reason: a description of natural law and a report of his own conversion. It is ultimately Lewis' accounts that shall give a possible final answer, when held in tandem with Anscombe, to the interplay between philosophy and faith in modernity.

Lewis describes the Law of Nature as a higher standard of behavior to which all individuals inherently adhere. Natural law is a code of conduct that reveals a higher standard of value judgements. However, this standard has been overshadowed by its more modern, empirical counterpart:

Now this Law or Rule about Right and Wrong used to be called the Law of Nature. Nowadays, when we talk of the 'laws of nature' we usually mean things like gravitation, or heredity, or the laws of chemistry...The idea was that, just

*as all bodies are governed by the law of gravitation, and organisms by biological laws, so the creature called man also had his law—with this great difference, that a body could not choose whether it obeyed the law of gravitation or not, but a man could choose either to obey the Law of Human Nature or to disobey it."*¹²

It is by this human law, separate from physical laws, that human beings operate. As aforementioned, this code informs all of our actions across all stages of life, dictating fairness and justice. However, Lewis states that this is the one form of law that, unique to humans, is also able to be broken as well. A person has no say if they are subject to gravity, but they do have a say in doing what is considered right. This description of the law of nature points to the ever present observation, made in some way by all of the thinkers discussed, that there is a longing in the human heart for the good. Yet, Lewis mentions how this Law of Nature has been set to the side, at least in its original sense, by post-Enlightenment figures. The valueless society that Kant and his contemporaries ushered in leaves no room for natural law, as they sought to understand the world through empirical means. Philosophy ceded territory to modern science, and in that, concern over faith and the ultimate good were lost as well. Humanity no longer recognizes divine truths and laws as institutions God gives to man, but rather something avoidable because they are breakable and voluntary.

Even if human beings have lost faith in and true knowledge of the law of nature after Kant, it is still worth defining the presence of faith in the remaining religious sphere. Lewis characterizes this kind of faith as the following:

*Faith seems to be used by Christians in two senses or on two levels, and I will take them in turn. In the first sense it means simply Belief—accepting or regarding as true the doctrines of Christianity. That is fairly simple. But what does puzzle people—at least it used to puzzle me—is the fact that Christians regard faith in this sense as a virtue. I used to ask how on earth it can be a virtue—what is there moral or immoral about believing or not believing a set of statements?"*¹³

This value judgment of faith as a virtue pits the philosopher, the person of reason, against

the virtue of faith. The virtue of faith is one that is debatable, as it cannot be understood through rational means. Faith exists outside of reason.

It is from Lewis' own life in this way that we may pull something truly illuminating to the question of whether a contradiction exists between Christianity and philosophy. Philosophy takes place in communion with others: the exchange of ideas and pursuit of the truth occurs when individuals push and pull against one another and their conceptions, often to the backdrop of the tradition of philosophers to come before them. In his memoir *Surprised by Joy*, Lewis describes his own conversion, which took place under similar conditions described in a philosophical undertaking:

You must picture me alone in that room at Magdalen, night after night, feeling, whenever my mind lifted even for a second from my work, the steady, unrelenting approach of Him whom I so earnestly desired not to meet. That which I greatly feared had at last come upon me. In the Trinity Term of 1929 I gave in, and admitted that God was God, and knelt and prayed: perhaps, that night, the most dejected and reluctant convert in all England.¹⁴

It is this moment of conversion above all else that created the spark of faith, Lewis declares. This is akin to Anscombe's assertion that faith comes from the individual. Faith cannot be objectively and universally understood because it is inherently neither of those things. Instead, faith is an individual matter. It can be aided by external sources and tradition, but it is something so deeply personal that it can only be understood within the believer themselves, and even then, is understood in the sense of a divine mystery. In a return to Aquinas once more, knowledge can be a preamble to faith. However, knowledge and reason alone cannot bridge the gap to God entirely. Philosophy can help propel someone to belief in God, but it is the individual who makes the ultimate, and the least conceivable, final step. Even if not happy about the truth, it is whenever the crutches of philosophy and reason are cast aside that faith, and indeed the ultimate truth, is reached, just not in the manner that empiricists and modern philosophers would like.

In the value-neutral society that has taken root after the Enlightenment, it is Anscombe's pagan, possibly exemplified by Lewis, who



exemplifies how one can attain a healthy relationship between faith and reason. While the relationship between the polar ends of faith and reason shift from epoch to epoch, it is possible that a form of Anscombe's philosophic pagan will offer a timeless solution and amelioration between the two lives.

The philosophic pagan is open, yet uncommitted, to the truths that may be held by the world. He is able to shuffle from camp to camp, untethered to empiricism, religious dogma, or anything in between. When considering Aquinas, a truth seems to reveal itself about the fate of this philosopher, however. The more knowledge one gains, the more this knowledge will direct its holder to faith. Reason itself in this way points to God. Finally, it is Lewis himself who may exemplify how the philosophic process leads one to faith. The example of Lewis may lead to a revival, and even a perfection, of the hope that Anscombe's pagan philosopher poses.

Working within the limitations of a postmodern world, unable to shirk the effects of Kant and his questioning, Lewis exemplifies how the pursuit of truth, even in secular ways, takes place within communion with others. The skeptic must have his ideas tried by others, as reason feels compelled to be validated. It is in exposure to others and their ideas of the truth, their beliefs, that human beings are drawn by their natural inclination to the Good and the highest truth possible. There is a deep value in this questioning period. Just as Anscombe's philosopher constantly moves from possible truth to possible truth, dedicated to no god or religion, so too does the skeptic in his pursuit of what he deems reasonable truth. Anscombe's philosopher internally recognizes his longing for the highest good, and that is what can save the skeptic as well. Having the orientation to this Good and Truth allows for questioning to take place without becoming completely unmoored. Philosophy and modern reason, even the philosophical pagan, close themselves off from this final possibility, either through settling on no truth or not wishing for the life of faith to offer a valuable truth.

In sum, knowledge breeds faith. But it is

in letting this knowledge one holds be open to change and critique, being dedicated to the truth over any particular religion or identifying camp, that the highest truth, which both philosophy and faith aim at, may be reached. Philosophy in its truest form is oriented and aims for the end that faith may provide. It is in letting philosophy run its healthiest course that the divine may be actualized. The Christian may be a philosopher, although they need not be necessarily. However, the philosopher, if they are truly in pursuit of truth and knowledge, will come to the end of the Christian life.

References

Film & Photomontage

1. Dziga Vertov, "Kinoks: A Revolution," in *Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov*, ed. Annette Michelson (Berkeley: UC Press, 1984), 15.
2. Vertov, 18-19.
3. Dawn Adès, *Photomontage*, (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd, 2021), 107-108.
4. *Blow-Up*, directed by Michaelangelo Antonioni (1966; Beverly Hills, CA: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 2004), Film.
5. Siegfried Kracauer, *Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality* (Oxford University Press, 1960), 20.

Humanity's Suicidal Beauty

1. Herman Melville, *Bartleby & Benito Cereno* (Garden City, NY: Dover Publications, 1990), 4.
2. Melville, 11.
3. Melville, 9.
4. Melville, 21.
5. Yevgeny Zamyatin, *We* (New York, NY: Harper Voyager, 2012), 86.
6. Zamyatin, 86.
7. Zamyatin, 86.
8. Zamyatin, 87.
9. Zamyatin, 87.
10. Zamyatin, 89.
11. Zamyatin, 90.
12. Zamyatin, 86.
13. Zamyatin, 178.
14. Zamyatin, 178.
15. Zamyatin, 180.
16. Zamyatin, 180.
17. Zamyatin, 181.
18. Zamyatin, 178.

Trials of an Islamic Sea

1. Edward A. Alpers, *The Indian Ocean in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 80.
2. Alpers, 81.
3. Walter Russell Mead, "The Connecticut Yankee in the Court of King Arthur," *Special*

Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Knopf, 2009), 133.

4. Andrew C. Ross, "Livingstone, David (1813-1873)." BU School of Theology, History of Missiology. <https://www.bu.edu/missiology/missionary-biography/l-m/livingstone-david-1813-1873/#:~:text=In%20March%201858%20Livingstone%20embarked,but%20was%20otherwise%20a%20disaster.>
5. "Henry Morton Stanley." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henry-Morton-Stanley>.
6. Ethan R. Sanders, "Missionaries and Muslims in East Africa before the Great War," March 9, 2011. <https://www.cccw.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Sanders-Ethan-9-Mar-2011.pdf>.
7. Sanders, 3.
8. Sanders, 5-6.
9. Ross, "Livingstone, David."
10. Sanders, "Missionaries and Muslims," 2.
11. Mead, "The Connecticut Yankee," 144.
12. Mead, 140.
13. Mead, 132-134.
14. Alpers, *The Indian Ocean*, 14.
15. Nile Green, *Bombay Islam: The Religious Economy of the West Indian Ocean, 1840-1915* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 29.
16. Alvaro Velho and João de Sá, *A Journal of the First Voyage of Vasco da Gama, 1497-1499* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1898), 15.
17. Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
18. Sanders, "Missionaries and Muslims," 1.
19. Sanders, 2-3.
20. Sanders, 8.
21. Sanders, 15.
22. Sanders, 15.
23. Alpers, *The Indian Ocean*, 124.
24. Alpers, 214.
25. Green, *Bombay Islam*, 20.
26. Green, 46.

27. Green, 44.

28. Green, 45.

California and the Civil War

1. William Downie, *Hunting for Gold: Reminiscences of Personal Experience and Research in the Early Days of the Pacific Coast from Alaska to Panama* (San Francisco: California Publishing Co., 1893), 28.
2. Downie, 9.
3. Downie, 8-9.
4. William Deverell, "Convalescence and California: The Civil War Comes West," *Southern California Quarterly* 90, no. 1 (2008): 11, doi: 10.2307/41172404.
5. Deverell, "Convalescence and California," 4.
6. Deverell, "Convalescence and California," 12.
7. Imogene Spaulding, "The Attitude of California to the Civil War," *Annual Publication of the Historical Society of Southern California* 9, no. 1/2 (1912): 104, doi: 10.2307/41168901.
8. Spaulding, 105.
9. Spaulding, 106.
10. Spaulding, 106.
11. Gerald Stanley, "Civil War Politics in California," *Southern California Quarterly* 64, no. 2 (1982): 116, doi: 10.2307/41170979.
12. Spaulding, "The Attitude of California to the Civil War," 104.
13. Spaulding, 105.
14. Benjamin Franklin Gilbert, "California and the Civil War: A Bibliographical Essay," *California Historical Society Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (1961): 292, doi: 10.2307/25155428.
15. Peter Hardeman Burnett, *Recollections and Opinions of an Old Pioneer* (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1880), 405.
16. Gilbert, "California and the Civil War," 293.
17. Deverell, "Convalescence and California," 12.
18. California Adjutant General's Office, *Records of California Men in the War of the Rebellion, 1861 to 1867* (Sacramento: State Office, 1890), 15.
19. California Adjutant General's Office, 15.
20. Stanley, "Civil War Politics in California," 118.

21. Stanley, "Civil War Politics in California," 119.
22. California Adjutant General's Office, 16.
23. Spaulding, "The Attitude of California to the Civil War," 104.
24. Spaulding, 108.
25. Spaulding, 104.
26. "California Civil War Diary of an Unknown Soldier, 1862-1863," University of Iowa Libraries, 1863, digital.lib.uiowa.edu/islandora/object/ui%3Aatestcwnd_4500.
27. "California Civil War Diary of an Unknown Soldier, 1862-1863."
28. Gilbert, "California and the Civil War," 291.
29. Spaulding, "The Attitude of California to the Civil War," 108.
30. Spaulding, 108.
31. California Adjutant General's Office, 5.
32. Gilbert, "California and the Civil War," 291.
33. Leo P Kibby, "Union Loyalty of California's Civil War Governors," *California Historical Society Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (1965): 315, doi: 10.2307/25155756.
34. Kibby, 316.
35. Kibby, 316.
36. Franklin Tuthill, *The History of California* (San Francisco: H. H. Bancroft & Company, 1866), 589.
37. Kibby, 311, 318.
38. Lewis C. Gunn and Elizabeth L. B. Gunn, *Records of a California Family; Journals and Letters of Lewis C. Gunn and Elizabeth Le Breton Gunn* (San Diego, 1928), 213, www.loc.gov/item/29018689/.
39. Gilbert, "California and the Civil War," 291.
40. Kibby, "Union Loyalty of California's Civil War Governors," 311.

Zora Neale Hurston Wrote, 'Let There Be Light!'

1. Zora Neale Hurston, "What White Publishers Won't Print," in *Folklore, Memoirs, and Other Writings*, ed. Cheryl A. Wall (Penguin Random House, 1995), 169.
2. Hurston, 169.
3. Hurston, 169.

4. Hurston, 169.
5. Hurston, 169.
6. Hurston, 169.
7. Hurston, 169.
8. Hurston, 169.
9. Hurston, 169.
10. Hurston, 169-170.
11. Hurston, 170.
12. Hurston, 170.
13. Hurston, 170.
14. Hurston, 170.
15. Hurston, 170.
16. Hurston, 171.
17. Hurston, 170.
18. Zora Neale Hurston, "The Gilded Six-Bits" in *Zora Neale Hurston: Novels & Stories* (Penguin Random House, 2009), 208.
19. Hurston, "White Publishers," 170.
20. Hurston, "The Gilded Six-Bits," 210.
21. Hurston, 211.
22. Hurston, 211.
23. Hurston, 211.
24. Hurston, 213.
25. Hurston, 213.
26. Hurston, 214.
27. Hurston, 214.
28. Hurston, "White Publishers," 171.
29. Hurston, 172.
30. Hurston, 172-173.
31. Hurston, 172.
32. Hurston, 171.

Rostova, Religiosity, and Raunchiness

1. Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, (New York: Vintage Classics, 2008), 541.
2. Hugh McLean, "A Woman's Place. . . : The Young Tolstoy and the 'Woman Question,'" *In Quest of Tolstoy* (Academic Studies Press, 2008), 115.
3. Adele Lindenmeyr, "Public Life, Private Virtues: Women in Russian Charity, 1762-1914," *Signs* 18, no. 3 (1993): 563, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3174858>.
4. Bernard Gorin, "Feminine Types in Tolstoy's

- Works," *The Sewanee Review* 16, no. 4 (1908): 444, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27530930>.
5. Gorin, 444.
6. McLean, "A Woman's Place," 116.
7. McLean, 108.
8. Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, 1155.
9. Laura J. Olson, "Russianness, Femininity, and Romantic Aesthetics in War and Peace," *The Russian Review* 56, no. 4 (1997): 522, <https://doi.org/10.2307/131563>.
10. Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, 512.
11. Juliet Mitchell, "Natasha and Hélène," *The Novel, Volume 2: Forms and Themes*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006): 534, muse.jhu.edu/book/100403.
12. Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, 1156.

The End of History, Revisited

1. Freddie deBoer, "No, Francis Fukuyama Is Wrong, Not Just Not Even Wrong," last modified February 13, 2023, <https://freddiedeboer.substack.com/p/no-francis-fukuyama-is-wrong-not>.
2. James Madison, "The Federalist Papers No. 10," *Avalon Project*, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp.
3. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin, 2020), 214.
4. Fukuyama, 236.
5. Fukuyama, 222.
6. Richard Hofstadter, "The Paranoid Style in American Politics," *Harper's Magazine*, March 23, 2021, <https://harpers.org/archive/1964/11/the-paranoid-style-in-american-politics/>.
7. Hofstadter.
8. Fukuyama, 334.
9. Bernard Crick, *Democracy: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 52.
10. Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 336.
11. "Interview with Ex-Neocon Francis Fukuyama: 'A Model Democracy Is Not Emerging in Iraq,'" *Der Spiegel*, March 22, 2006, www.spiegel.de/international/interview-with-

- ex-neocon-francis-fukuyama-a-model-democracy-is-not-emerging-in-iraq-a-407315.html.
12. "Interview with ... Fukuyama."
13. Fukuyama, 354.
14. Fukuyama, 357.
15. Fukuyama, 356.
16. George Orwell, "Politics and the English Language," The Orwell Foundation, January 24, 2024, <https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/politics-and-the-english-language/>.

Japanese Modernization and Cultural Globalization

1. John H. Schroeder, *Matthew Calbraith Perry: Antebellum Sailor and Diplomat* (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 286.
2. Jeremy Adelman, et al. *Worlds Together, Worlds Apart: A History of the World from the Beginnings of Humankind to the Present* (Sixth Edition) (Volume 2) (New York, W. W. Norton, 2021), 544.
3. Adelman, 720.
4. Saburō Ienaga, "Japan's Modernization and Buddhism," *Contemporary Religions in Japan* 6, no. 1 (1965).
5. Ienaga, 3.
6. Ienaga, 3.
7. George L. Davis. *A paper upon the origin of the Japan Expedition: read the 7th of May, 1857, before the Maryland Historical Society*. Manuscript. (Baltimore, John Murphy & Co., 1860), 10.
8. Michio Kitahara, "Commodore Perry and the Japanese: A Study in the Dramaturgy of Power," *Symbolic Interaction* 9, no. 1 (Spring 1986), 61.
9. J.G. Caiger and Richard Mason, *A History of Japan* (Singapore: Tuttle Publishing, 1997), 263.
10. Kitahara, "Commodore Perry and the Japanese," 61.
11. Caiger and Mason, *A History of Japan*, 258.
12. Adelman, et al. *Worlds Together, Worlds*

- Apart*, 720.
13. Caiger and Mason, *A History of Japan*, 258.
14. Adelman, et al. *Worlds Together, Worlds Apart*, 720.
15. Caiger and Mason, *A History of Japan*, 280.
16. Robert E. Ward, "Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan," *World Politics* 15, no. 4 (1963), 2.
17. Caiger and Mason, *A History of Japan*, 271.
18. Adelman, et al. *Worlds Together, Worlds Apart*, 721.
19. Satoshi Machida, "Does Globalization Render People More Ethnocentric? Globalization and People's Views on Cultures," *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 71, no. 2 (2012): 457.

Russia, Ukraine, and the Ghosts of a Bloody Century

1. "About RT." RT International. *Novosti RIA*, 2022. <https://www.rt.com/about-us/>.
2. "About RT."
3. Russia Today, "Donbass Evacuees Speak to RT," Rumble video, posted February 23, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vvn3kl-donbass-evacuees-speak-to-rt.html>.
4. "Donbass Evacuees Speak to RT."
5. Russia Today, "Life under shelling | Millions flee Ukraine as conflict escalates," Rumble video, posted March 14, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vxdbrij-life-under-shelling-millions-flee-ukraine-as-conflict-escalates.html>.
6. Russia Today, "Life under Shelling."
7. Russia Today, "10 year old boy on how he survived attack on Donetsk," Rumble video, posted March 15, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vxgztn-10-year-old-boy-on-how-he-survived-attack-on-donetsk.html>.
8. Russia Today, "Donetsk battle in full swing | Locals flee, losing homes," Rumble video, posted March 1, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vw5xal-donetsk-battle-in-full-swing-locals-flee-losing-homes.html>.
9. Russia Today, "Russian troops continue advance as operation enters 5th day," Rumble

- video, posted February 28, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vw32zo-russian-troops-continue-advance-as-operation-enters-5th-day.html>.
10. Russia Today, “‘8 years without water’ | Russian forces restore water supply for Crimea,” Rumble video, posted March 16, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vxkmfl-8-years-without-water-russian-forces-restore-water-supply-for-crimea.html>.
 11. Russia Today, “RT visits airfield servicing Russian attack helicopters,” Rumble video, posted March 12, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vx6at3-rt-visits-airfield-servicing-russian-attack-helicopters.html>.
 12. Russia Today, “RT visits airfield.”
 13. Russia Today, “Geneva Convention violation | Ukrainian army filming war prisoners abuse,” Rumble video, posted March 8, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vwt3pj-geneva-convention-violation-ukrainian-army-filming-war-prisoners-abuse.html>.
 14. Russia Today, “Russian troops continue advance.”
 15. Russia Today, “Fighting continues | Military operation in Ukraine enters its 6th day,” Rumble video, posted March 1, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vw5xbf-fighting-continues-military-operation-in-ukraine-enters-its-6th-day.html>.
 16. Russia Today, “Fighting continues.”
 17. Russia Today, “‘Abandoned in a hurry’ | RT takes a look inside seized Ukrainian Navy ships,” Rumble video, posted March 14, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vxdi4d-abandoned-in-a-hurry-rt-takes-a-look-inside-seized-ukrainian-navy-ships.html>.
 18. Russia Today, “‘Former home to elites’ | RT explores abandoned Ukrainian base,” Rumble video, posted March 15, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vxh9r5-former-home-to-elites-rt-explores-abandoned-ukrainian-base.html>.
 19. Russia Today, “Kiev TV tower hit by explosion, blasts reported in several Ukrainian cities,” Rumble video, posted March 2, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vw81j1-kiev-tv-tower-hit-by-explosion-blasts-reported-in-several-ukrainian-cities.html>.
 20. Russia Today, “Russian operation in Ukraine | Day 8,” Rumble video, posted March 3, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vwbqyn-russian-operation-in-ukraine-day-8.html>.
 21. Russia Today, “RT visits alleged Aidar battalion prison in LPR,” Rumble video, posted March 12, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vx657h-rt-visits-alleged-aidar-battalion-prison-in-lpr.html>.
 22. Russia Today, “Ukrainian neo-Nazi prisoners recall horrific days in jail,” Rumble video, posted March 16, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vxskh-ukrainian-neo-nazi-prisoners-recall-horrific-days-in-jail.html>.
 23. Russia Today, “Russia sends humanitarian aid to Melitopol, Ukraine,” Rumble video, posted March 4, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vwficl-russia-sends-humanitarian-aid-to-melitopol-ukraine.html>.
 24. Russia Today, “RT visits alleged Aidar battalion.”
 25. Russia Today, “Russia claims Ukraine destroying evidence of US-funded bioweapons program,” Rumble video, posted March 8, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vwt3ld-russia-claims-ukraine-destroying-evidence-of-us-funded-bioweapons-program.html>.
 26. Russia Today, “Russian military offensive in Ukraine | Day 20,” Rumble video, posted March 16, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vxk45l-russian-military-offensive-in-ukraine-day-20.html>.
 27. Russia Today, “American journalist killed in Ukraine while filming evacuees,” Rumble video, posted March 14, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vxdgbn-american-journalist-killed-in-ukraine-while-filming-evacuees.html>.
 28. Russia Today, “Russia sends humanitarian aid.”
 29. Russia Today, “Bullied for food | Nationalists force Ukrainians to choose between aid or land,” Rumble video, posted March 8, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vwt3s1-bullied-for-food-nationalists-force-ukrainians-to-choose-between-aid-or-land.html>.

- food-nationalists-force-ukrainians-to-choose-between-aid-or-land.html.
30. Russia Today, “Bullied for food.”
 31. Russia Today, “Bullied for food.”
 32. Russia Today, “Russian military offensive in Ukraine | Day 16,” Rumble video, posted March 11, 2022, <https://rumble.com/vx4va3-russian-military-offensive-in-ukraine-day-16.html>.
 33. Russia Today, “Bullied for food.”

Can the Philosopher Be a Christian

1. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, “The act of faith,” *Secunda Secundae Partis* Question 2, <https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3002.htm>.
2. Aquinas.
3. Aquinas.
4. Aquinas.
5. Aquinas.
6. Aquinas.
7. G. E. M. Anscombe, *Faith in a Hard Ground: Essays on Religion, Philosophy and Ethics*, ed. Mary Geach and Luke Gormally, (Exeter: Andrews UK Limited, 2008).
8. Anscombe.
9. Anscombe, 95.
10. Anscombe, 96.
11. Anscombe, 100.
12. C. S. Lewis, *Mere Christianity*, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1952), 4.
13. Lewis, 138.
14. C. S. Lewis, *Surprised by Joy*, (2016), 266.

2023-2024 Staff



Brigid Alvis
Editor in Chief



Elise Bloom
Submissions Editor



Caroline O'Neal
*Editor of Philosophy,
Religious Studies, English*



Helena Harte
*Editor of Political Science,
Political Theory*



Charlotte Cross
*Editor of Political Science,
English*



Dr. Adam Thomas
Faculty Advisor



Ashley Anderson
*Lead Graphic Designer,
Layout Artist*



Kaitlyn Turnell
Layout Artist



Russell Crosthwait
*Editor of History,
Philosophy, Religious Studies*



Griffin Honig
*Editor of Political Theory,
History*



Lincoln Harder
*Editor of Political Science,
English*



Elizabeth Zarrilli
*Illustrator, Editor of Arts &
Architecture, Economics*



Lauren Gouveia
*Editor of Anthropology,
Sociology, History*



Andrew Hiner
Editor of History, English



Michael Stebbins
*Editor of History,
Economics*



Anna Scott Nuttall
*Editor of Anthropology,
Sociology, Psychology*



